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INTRODUCTION
This article uses economic criteria to assess the efficiency of select
provisions of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods ("CISG").' Signed in Vienna in 1980 and
ratified by more than seventy countries, the CISG "applies to
contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business
are in different [Contracting] States."2 Reflecting diverse legal
traditions, the CISG provides an interesting mix of civil and common
law rules.3 When civil and common law rules coincide, the CISG
typically adopts the convergent view.4 When they differ, the CISG
sometimes adopts one approach and sometimes the other. In certain
instances, the CISG creates alternative rules assumed to be the result
of negotiation and compromise among the drafting nations.' In other
1. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG].
2. Id. art. 1. Additionally, CISG jurisdiction applies if relevant private
international or conflict of law rules "lead to the application of the law of a
Contracting State," thereby allowing for the application of CISG rules even if only
one party has its place of business in a Contracting State. Id. art. 1(1)(b). However,
some countries, most notably the United States, availed themselves of Article 95,
which allows states to declare, upon ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession
to the CISG, that they will not be bound by Article 1(1)(b) . Id. art. 95; Status of
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/iew
Details.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg no=X-10&chapter -10&lang=e
n (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
3. See generally Alejandro M. Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in
the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 23 INT'L
LAW. 443 (1989).
4. See id. at 453 ("[T]he Convention reflects more a blending of the two legal
traditions rather than the prevalence of one over the other.").
5. See id. at 450 (recounting that the drafters of the CISG engaged in dynamic
debates that ultimately led to compromises over the integration of concepts from
different legal systems).
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instances, the drafting nations failed to reach consensus resulting in
gaps in the CISG that expressly exclude specific areas of law6 or
amount to implicit delegation.7
The goal of this article is to analyze whether the most efficient
rules were selected from among the civil and common law
alternatives or whether other considerations resulted in the election
of a non-efficient alternative. Selection of an inefficient CISG rule
takes one of two forms-either (1) a compromise away from a more
efficient national rule' or (2) a bargaining impasse leading to the
abdication of efficient selection.' The Chicago School's normative
goal of wealth maximization provides a useful benchmark with
which to compare the efficiency of alternative contract law rules.io
6. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 4-5 (stating that CISG is not concerned with
property rights or products liability).
7. See id. arts. 28, 78 (delegating to the states issues such as specific
performance (Article 28) and the process of selling rejected goods (Article 88)).
8. See, e.g., infra Part II.B. 1 (discussing how the United States compromised
away from a more efficient national rule when it agreed not to have a writing
requirement in the CISG-so as to better mirror civil law rules and promote
conformity, notwithstanding the fact that its Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C.") contains such a requirement). By electing not to opt out of the no
writing requirement, the United States created divergent rules for its legal
systems-one for domestic sales and one for international sales. Whatever one's
opinion of the efficiency of the statute of frauds, it is clear that applying different
rules in similar situations is inefficient because it raises the level of uncertainty and
increases transactions costs. See George L Priest, The Common Law Process and
the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 67 (1977) (explaining that
inefficient rules impose higher costs than efficient rules because they result in the
inefficient assignment of liability and greater avoidance costs).
9. See Carlo H. Mastellone, Sales-Related Issues Not Covered by the CISG:
Assignment, Set-off Statute ofLimitations, Etc., Under Italian Law, 5 VINDOBONA
J. INT'L COM. L. & ARB. 143, 147 (2001) (identifying a variety of issues within the
scope of sales law that are not covered by the CISG as identified by foreign and
Italian courts). A bargaining impasse can lead to a less comprehensive code or
convention. In such cases, relevant issues may be excluded due to non-agreement.
See infra Part II.A. (discussing the inefficiency of non-selectivity, with particular
reference to the enforceability of penalty clauses).
10. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 4 (7th ed. 2007)
(defining efficiency in terms of wealth maximization). A rule that results in greater
wealth maximization is more efficient than a rule that results in less wealth
maximization. The wealth maximization principle asserts that distributional
consequences should be irrelevant in the enforcement of contract rules since the
key goal is an overall net gain in utility. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott,
Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (2003)
(suggesting that contract law should encourage efforts of contracting parties to
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To understand the efficiency implications of impasse, one needs to
compare the wealth maximization implications of a centralized rule
with the wealth implications of a decentralized and heterogeneous
legal regime.
The analysis proceeds in four parts followed by a conclusion. Part
I begins with a brief history of the CISG, identifying the choices
involved in the drafting process. It then discusses the central tenets of
the economic analysis of law ("EAL"). Part II uses these tenets to
assess the efficiency of specific CISG rules, including rules
addressing liquidated damages, evidentiary rules governing the
statute of frauds, such as the use of parol evidence, and rules
addressing contract interpretation and formation. Part III discusses
the implications of these CISG choices for best business practices.
Part IV assesses the value of comparative EAL as a means of
understanding and critiquing legal reforms.
Taken collectively, the analysis illuminates the structure and
choices incumbent in the CISG. It also illustrates the usefulness of
EAL as a means of advancing comparative contract law. Over the
last thirty years, EAL has emerged as a leading jurisprudential view,
especially in the United States, that informs judicial decision-
making, legal education, and scholarly analysis. The present analysis
demonstrates its usefulness in a comparative law context.
I. CISG AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
A. DRAFTING THE CISG
The CISG reflects a culmination of a century old process of failed
attempts to achieve an international sales law." Given the differences
in the legal systems involved-civil, socialist, and common law-the
drafting process involved intense negotiation and compromise.12
Compromise at times took the avenue of abdication. In areas such as
maximize "contractual surplus").
11. See PETER HUBER & ALASTAIR MULLIS, THE CISG: A NEW TEXTBOOK FOR
STUDENTS AND PRACTITIONERS 2-3 (2007) (explaining that the development of the
CISG can be traced back to the creation of the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law ("UNIDROIT") and the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL)).
12. See generally JOHN 0. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES (1989).
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specific performance," validity,14 and pre-contractual liability," the
CISG designates national law as the source of relevant rules. In this
way, the CISG is less comprehensive than it potentially could have
been as some areas of coverage are left to the inefficiency of the
private international law system that the CISG was attempting to
replace. Notwithstanding this and other limitations, the CISG
embodies a major advance in international law.
Generally speaking, one of the most important functions of any
system of contract law is to offer to the parties a set of ready-made
"default rules" that do not require bargaining. 6 This function is
undermined by a less comprehensive code, which does not offer the
necessary mix of optimal defaults for the parties. Hence, in drafting
the CISG, member states needed to agree on which default rules to
embrace. Failure to agree threatened the overall efficiency of the
system. 17
The drafters of the CISG had to select a core methodology in order
to build an international sales law. They employed both the
"common core" and "better rule" approaches." The common core
13. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 28 (providing that "a court is not bound to
enter a judgment for specific performance unless the court would do so under its
own law").
14. See id. art. 4(a) (stating that the CISG is "not concerned with . . . the
validity of the contract or of any of its provisions").
15. See id. art. 4 (noting that the CISG "governs only the formation of the
contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer").
16. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and
Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REv. 821, 822-23 (1992) (acknowledging that
default rules apply only if the parties' agreement fails to provide a necessary term).
This is the gap-filling function of contract law. Like the U.C.C., the CISG is
largely made up of default rules. Stated in the alternative, parties are free to
derogate from most of the rules supplied by the U.C.C. or CISG. There is a deep
literature discussing the notion of default rules. See, e.g., id. at 825-26 (arguing
that by failing to provide a necessary term, contracting parties are consenting to the
default rules; therefore, default rules are not the product of regulation but rather
consent and private autonomy); see also Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default
Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REv. 489, 490 (1989)
(examining default rules in the context of the philosophy of promising and the
implications thereto).
17. See generally HONNOLD, supra note 12.
18. See Ole Lando, The Common Core of European Private Law and the
Principles of European Contract Law, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 809,
809 (1998) (explaining that the "common core" approach is a comparative research
method that is used to determine if there is a common core among differing legal
2011] 375
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approach was used whenever the civil law and common law rules
were essentially similar and there was little difference in national
interpretations of those rules.19 The fact that the negotiators
possessed expertise in both civil and common law framed the
discussions. Given that background, the CISG reflects the common
core of the major principles found in the civil and common law legal
traditions. The common core approach is essentially a descriptive
enterprise that provides a better understanding of the similar rules
and principles found in most legal systems.20
The better rule approach, by contrast, was needed whenever
common law and civil law conflicted, or whenever national
interpretations of facially similar rules varied.2 ' Implicit in this
choice is the normative determination of whether alternative rules or
interpretations are better. An extended analysis would ask whether
fabrication of an alternative rule would prove even better in
advancing the normative goals of an international sales law.
1. Types of Rules
Employing the common core and better rules approaches resulted
in an interesting amalgam of common and civil law rules. The CISG
consists of rules that can be characterized as: (1) rules consistent
with both common and civil law legal traditions, (2) rules that
recognize the superiority of a given common or civil law rule-at
systems); see also Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei, The Common Core Approach to
European Private Law, 3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 339, 347 (1998) (noting that the goal
of the "common core" approach is "to provide with the highest degree of precision
a map of the relevant elements of different legal systems").
19. See Bussani & Mattei, supra note 18, at 340 (explaining that the purpose
behind the common core approach is to unearth what European's private law has in
common with civil law, common law, and other western legal traditions).
20. See id. at 347 ("The fundamental characteristic of the common core
research is that it analyzes the existing situation without trying in any way to force
uniform solutions.").
21. See Disa Sim, The Scope and Application of Good Faith in the Vienna
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, in REVIEW OF THE
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 19, 63
(Michael Maggi ed., 2004) (citing M.J. BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT LAW: THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 65 (2d ed., 1997) (characterizing the better rule
approach as having the purpose of adopting rules that are the most persuasive and
well-suited for cross-border transactions, regardless of how many countries have
adopted them for domestic use).
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least for the sake of transborder transactions, (3) rules that are
fabricated to be national system-neutral, (4) rules that abdicate to
national law by expressly refusing to cover certain topics, and (5)
rules that fit in one of the first three categories but are subject to
modification by the CISG's preference for original or autonomous
interpretation of its rules.22
The first category of rules has the closest affinity to a common
core approach. The evolution of similar rules in different legal
traditions may suggest that these rules reflect the needs of commerce
and are inherently efficient,23 but this will not always be the case.
There is no guarantee that the "common rules" found in both legal
traditions are the "better rules." Common rules possess value,
however, because they tend to provide stability and to avoid
misunderstandings between contracting parties.
The second category of rules-the primary focus of the analysis in
Part II-represents instances where there was a selection between
opposing civil and common law rules. Consider, for example, the
CISG's rejection of the United States Uniform Commercial Code's
("U.C.C.") perfect tender rule24 in favor of a fundamental breach
22. See, e.g., CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1) (stating that in interpreting the CISG
"regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote
uniformity in its application"). It has generally been argued that regard to those
goals implies original or autonomous interpretation of its Articles-that is, an
interpretation not framed by the national law of the court (homeward trend bias).
See Frank Diedrich, Maintaining Uniformity in International Uniform Law via
Autonomous Interpretation: Software Contracts and the CISG, 8 PACE INT'L L.
REV. 303, 312 (1996) (defining "autonomous interpretation" as "a supranational
synthesis combining single methods that form a new canon of interpretation"); see
also LARRY A. DIMATTEO ET AL., INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF CISG JURISPRUDENCE 6, 12 (2005) (urging that the "international
character [of the CISG] calls for a non-domestic, autonomous interpretation . . .
divorced from the idiosyncrasies of domestic jurisprudence"); Angela Maria
Romito & Charles Sant 'Elia, Comment, CISG: Italian Court and Homeward
Trend, 14 PACE INT'L L. REV. 179, 185-86 (2002) (providing an example of the
tendency to interpret the CISG through the prism of national law instead of a
newly developed international legal methodology).
23. See Priest, supra note 8, at 72 (observing how legal rules tend to become
more efficient as time passes because "efficient rules 'survive' in an evolutionary
sense because they are less likely to be relegated and thus less likely to be
changed" while "inefficient rules 'perish' because they are more likely to be
reviewed and review implies the chance of change").
24. See U.C.C. § 2-601 (1977) (allowing a buyer to reject the seller's goods if
they "fail in any respect to conform to the contract").
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rule. 25 Given the distribution system and readily available secondary
markets in the United States, the U.C.C. provides a right to the buyer
to reject non-conforming goods for any reason.26 The reselling and
reshipping of goods within domestic markets is manageable, and thus
a pro-buyer rule is reasonable in such a context.27 In contrast, this
rule in the international context proves problematic. The higher costs
of reselling or reshipping the goods are likely to lead to waste. Due
to such costs and a lack of a readily available secondary market, the
seller may simply elect not to retrieve the goods. In order to
discourage such waste, the CISG limits the buyer's right to reject.28
This reflects the more efficient choice because the buyer is in a better
position to make use of or resell the nonconforming goods. The
CISG protects the buyer by providing a price reduction remedy, not
found in the common law, which allows the buyer to unilaterally
reduce the contract price to reflect the diminishment of value caused
by the nonconformity.2 9 In the end, the seller avoids the costs of
retrieving the goods and the buyer is made whole through a price
reduction.30
25. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 25, 49 (permitting the buyer to avoid the
contract if the seller commits a "fundamental breach," which is defined as a breach
that detriments the buyer to the extent that it "substantially" deprives him of "what
he is entitled to expect under the contract").
26. U.C.C. § 2-601(a) (1977).
27. Cf David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104
HARV. L. REV. 373, 375 (1990) (urging that non-contract sanctions such as
relationship-destroying and reputational costs likely curtail the use of the rule as a
bad faith means to terminate a contract). See generally Stewart Macaulay, Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55
(1963). This does not however solve the moral hazard problem where the buyer
uses the perfect tender rule in order to avoid the contract in a market with falling
prices. The solution is the seller negotiating a modification to the rule in the
contract. See William H. Lawrence, The Revision of Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: Appropriate Standards of a Buyer's Refusal to Keep Gods
Tendered by a Seller, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1650-51 (1994) (indicating
further the possibility to counter this potential problem by adding a requirement of
good faith on the part of the buyer).
28. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 25, 49 (requiring the breach to be
"fundamental"-or that the buyer is substantially deprived of contract
expectations).
29. See id art. 50 (permitting a reduction to contract price at time of delivery
regardless of whether the contract price was already paid to the seller ).
30. The buyer is also able to collect any other damages that it incurred due to
the delivery of nonconforming goods. See, e.g., Delchi Carter, SpA v. Rotorex
Corp., No. 88-CV-1078, 1994 WL 495787, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1994)
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Despite the general similarities of the sales law of the
representative countries, there remained a significant number of
differences in which a choice between civil and common law had to
be made. Examples include: (1) the adoption of the civil law's
receipt rule" for the effectiveness of acceptances over the common
law's dispatch or mailbox rule;32 (2) the selection of the civil law's
material breach rule for rejection or avoidance of contracts over the
American U.C.C.'s perfect tender rule;33 (3) the selection of the civil
law's enforcement of purely oral sales agreements over the U.C.C.'s
statute of frauds;34 and (4) the rejection of the common law's parol
evidence rule in favor of the free admissibility of extrinsic
evidence."
The third category of rules recognizes that the CISG drafters, in
rare instances, fabricated new rules instead of adopting existing
(common or competing) national rules. Unfortunately, from an
efficiency perspective this does not always result in the adoption of
better rules. For example, the no-writing/writing hybrid rule
embodied by Articles 11 and 1236 was an inefficient political
compromise resulting from an attempt to incorporate opposing rules
into a unified law.37
(awarding the buyer compensatory damages for the buyer's attempts to remedy the
nonconformity of seller's goods because the damages were foreseeable as a result
of the seller's breach).
31. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 18 ("An acceptance of an offer becomes
effective at the moment the indication of assent reaches the offeror.").
32. See U.C.C. § 2-206 (1977) (inviting acceptance of an offer by "any manner
and by any [reasonable] medium"); see also infra Part II.D.1 (discussing the
mailbox rule).
33. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
34. See infra Part II.B. 1 (discussing the writing requirement). Compare U.C.C.
§ 2-201 (imposing a writing requirement), with CISG, supra note 1, art. 11 ("A
contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing . . . .").
35. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the parol evidence rule). Compare U.C.C.
§ 2-202 (1977) ("Terms ... set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final
expression of their agreement . .. may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior
agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement. . . ."), with CISG, supra note
1, art. 8 (casting a wide net for all evidence relevant to the interpretation of
contract terms-including prior conduct and negotiation history).
36. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 11-12 (indicating that contracts for sale need
not be in writing per Article 11, unless one of the parties resides in a Contracting
State which has made an Article 96 declaration under the CISG per Article 12).
37. See infra Part II.B.1 (commenting on the inherent inefficiency of such a
system).
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The fourth category involves nonselective inefficiency-or the
failure to provide any rules or coverage. There are numerous places
where the CISG fails to provide rules in areas that a more
comprehensive international code would cover. For example, the
negotiating parties failed to agree on a legal regime in areas such as
product liability and specific performance. 38 Hence, the CISG is less
comprehensive than it could be and, as a consequence, is less
efficient than it should be since it fails to harmonize international
sales law in these (and other) areas. 3 9 Generally, rules from different
legal systems competed for recognition, and in most cases one of the
competitors was selected.4 0 Where the negotiators were unable to
agree on the better rule, compromise often resulted in abdication or
removal of coverage.4 1
The fifth and final category of rules involves issues of
interpretation. These rules reflect the temporal nature of fixed rules.
The evolution of rule application and adjustment, obtained by
studying the resulting jurisprudence, has led to a voluminous CISG
38. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 5, 28 (expressly excluding coverage over
products liability for personal injury and implicitly delegating the issue of specific
performance to states).
39. See Sim, supra note 21, at 61 (reasoning that due to a lack of coherence in
the CISG's good faith concept and no explanation of the concept's meaning given
by any delegate of the convention, the predictability and efficiency of good faith in
international sales will be undermined as domestic decision makers interpret the
concept in varying ways).
40. See Avery W. Katz, Remedies for Breach of Contract under the CISG, 25
INT. REv. L. ECON. 378, 378, 384 (2006) (offering examples where the drafters
preferred one legal tradition over another, such as the CISG's selection of the civil
law's specific relief rules rather the common law's preference for monetary
damages). Selections like this are sometimes obscured by the CISG's usage of
terms not readily found in any national legal system. This phenomenon ostensibly
advances the notion of neutrality and encourages autonomous interpretation of the
rules. Thus, words like "avoidance," "fundamental breach," and "non-conformity"
are utilized instead of the common law's "rejection," "material breach," and
"defect." CISG, supra note 1, arts. 25, 35, 81; see Vikki M. Rogers & Albert H.
Kritzer, A Uniform International Sales Law Terminology, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR
PETER SCHLECHTRIEM ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 223, 237 (Ingeborg Schwenzer &
Giinter Hager eds., 2003), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cisgIbiblio/rogers2.html (stating that in legal research using domestic terminology,
such as "rescission of the contract," a lawyer would not find CISG cases that
typically use the phrase "avoidance of the contract").
41. See, e.g., CISG, supra note 1, art. 4 (declaring that the CISG is concerned
with the formation of contracts rather than the validity of contracts).
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literature.42 The important point here is that even where the drafters
chose between competing national rules, the CISG expressly rejects
the use of any corresponding national jurisprudence4 3 and instead
espouses original interpretation of its rules." CISG interpretive
methodology requires the interpretation of CISG rules based upon
the general principles underlying the CISG, not by concepts found in
a domestic legal system.4 5 This approach aims to foster a "better
jurisprudence" in the future interpretation of CISG rules. The judicial
or arbitral interpreter is mandated to interpret CISG rules with regard
to the CISG's "international character and to the need to promote
uniformity in its application."4 6 This requires the search for original
interpretations 47 and rejects "homeward trend" bias48 in which
national rules and jurisprudence are used to fill in interpretive gaps.
The fact that the drafters often selected national, system-neutral
terminology-such as avoidance, non-conformity, and fundamental
breach-indicates their desire for the development of original,
uniform, and more efficient interpretations of CISG rules.49
42. See Bibliography, PACE L. SCH. INST. INT'L COM. L.,
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/biblio.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2010)
(containing a bibliography with 9,069 citations to works on the CISG).
43. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 7 ("In the interpretation of this Convention,
regard is to be had to its international character . . . ."); Franco Ferrari, Uniform
Interpretation of the 1980 Uniform Sales Law, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 183,
200-01 (1994) (urging that an interpreter of the CISG "should not read the
Convention through the lenses of domestic law, but should project the interpretive
problems against an international background").
44. See Ferrari, supra note 43, at 198-201 (describing the interpretation of the
CISG as independent and not reliant on any specific legal system).
45. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Franco Ferrari, Gap-Filling and Interpretation of the CISG:
Overview of International Case Law, 7 VINDOBONA J. INT'L COM. L. & ARB. 63,
65 (2003) (indicating that CISG should be interpreted autonomously even though
once it is in full force, it is integrated into domestic law).
48. See, e.g., Timoth N. Tuggey, Note, The 1980 United Nations Convention
on the International Sale of Goods: Will a Homeward Trend Emerge?, 21 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 540, 554 (1986) (warning that a homeward trend bias would undermine
the goal of the CISG to promote uniformity).
49. See U.N. Comm. on Int'l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Introduction to the
Digest of Case Law on the United Nations Sales Convention, Note by the
Secretariat, T 4, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/562 (June 9, 2004) ("The drafters of the
Convention took special care in avoiding the use of legal concepts typical of a
given legal tradition, concepts often accompanied by a wealth of well-established
case law and related literature that would not be easy to transplant in different legal
2011] 381
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2. Summary
The drafters of the CISG faced a number of dilemmas in
negotiating a convention to supersede the legal rules of both civil and
common law countries. The first was selecting among inherently
conflictive rules. Examples include the writing requirement (statute
of frauds) and the parol evidence rule. Generally, these two doctrines
are prominent in common law systems"o but not as pervasive or
formalized in civil law countries." Other examples include the
perfect tender rule found in the U.C.C. versus the fundamental or
material breach rule in the civil law,52 and the civil law's receipt rule
versus the common law's dispatch rule in the area of effectiveness of
acceptance."
The second dilemma when drafting the CISG was whether to
incorporate or ignore legal concepts that exist in one system but are
foreign to the other system. Examples of incorporation include the
adoption of the price reduction remedy54 and Nachfrist notice,"5 both
cultures."); C.M BIANCA & M.J. BONELL, COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL
SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 74 (1987) ("When drafting the
single provisions these experts had to find sufficiently neutral language on which
they could reach a common understanding.").
50. See, e.g., Louis F. Del Duca, Implementation of Contract Formation Statute
of Frauds, Parol Evidence, and Battle of Forms CISG Provisions in Common Law
Countries, 25 J.L. & CoM. 133, 134 (2005) (making the point that Article 11 of the
CISG was initially misapplied in the United States, a common law country,
because the U.S. has a statute of fraud provision for the sale of goods); see also id.
at 142-43 (discussing MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova
D'Agostino, S.P.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 1392-93 (11th Cir. 1998), where the court held
that the U.S. parol evidence rule did not apply in cases implicating the CISG).
51. Cf Joshua D. H. Karton & Lorraine de Germiny, Has the CSIG Advisory
Council Come ofAge?, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 448, 470 ("Civil law has no rules
analgous to these doctrines . . . .").
52. See Jilrgen Basedow, Towards a Universal Doctrine ofBreach of Contract:
The Impact of the CISG, 25 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 487, 493 (2005) (concluding
that the concept of breach as found in CISG Article 46 is indicative of the common
law but also "introduces a new category of non-conformity into civil law
jurisdictions").
53. See, e.g., Marwan Al Ibrahim, Ala'eldin Ababneh & Hisham Tahat, The
Postal Acceptance Rule in the Digital Age, 2 J. INT'L COM. L. & TECH. 47, 47
(2007) (explaining the common law's dispatch or mail box rule as constituting
acceptance upon mailing or posting).
54. CISG, supra note 1, art. 50; see Eric E. Bergsten & Anthony J. Miller, The
Remedy of Reduction of Price, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 255, 255, 265, 271 (1979)
(detailing the drafting history of the price reduction remedy and evaluating its
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of which are foreign to common law systems. A vague and
potentially crippling abdication of coverage is found in the deference
of Article 4 to national law on issues pertaining to validity. This
abdication was largely due to countries' desire to protect the
operation of their consumer protection laws.56 Unfortunately, the
CISG fails to provide a definition of "validity," which may allow
Article 4 to be used to invalidate contract terms intended to be
covered by the CISG. The use of Article 4 to adopt nation-specific
rules undermines the CISG's unifying goal and diminishes its overall
efficiency.5 7
B. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT LAW
The EAL movement in the United States traces its modem roots to
the 1960s," but the milestone event is the 1973 publication of Judge
implications).
55. CISG, supra note 1, arts. 47, 48, 63; see Ericson P. Kimbel, Nachfrist
Notice and Avoidance under the CISG, 18 J.L. & COM. 301, 302, 305-07 (1999)
(explaining that Nachfrist notice "is the Convention's only route to avoidance
without an initial fundamental breach" as it provides a notice procedure through
which, upon a failed delivery, the buyer gives notice to the seller that he has a
reasonable time period to fully perform and upon expiration of such time, if the
seller has not performed, then the buyer may declare avoidance per CISG Article
26).
56. See PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW: THE UN-CONVENTION
ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 32 (1986) ( "Economic
regulations such as export or import controls or consumer-protection laws which
prohibit certain formulations may void contracts falling under the Convention").
57. See Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The Validity
Exception to the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18
YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 4-5 (1993) (asserting that the CISG's abdication in this area
"raises difficult questions, such as how a tribunal is to ascertain which issues are
validity issues and to what extent applying non-uniform domestic rules of validity .
. . seriously handicaps the CISG's potential for achieving its goals").
58. See generally Ronald H. Coase, Law and Economics at Chicago, 36 J.L. &
ECoN. 239 (1993) (discussing the origins of EAL at the University of Chicago);
Daniel A. Farber, Economic Efficiency and the Ex Ante Perspective, in THE
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 54, 56-
64 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000) (discussing the intellectual history
of the debate on law and economics). Three influential works in the area of EAL
are Becker on crimes and punishment, Calabresi on torts, and Coase on property.
See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76
J. POL. EcON. 169 (1968); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution
and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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Richard Posner's Economic Analysis of Law.5 9 Posner's approach is
part of the Chicago School of EAL, asserting that common law rules
evolve efficiently.60 The idea of EAL also developed in Europe and
led to the establishment of the European Association of Law and
Economics ("EALE").1
EAL scholarship developed into a major school of legal thought in
American law schools, 62 despite the reluctant reception and outright
opposition of the late seventies and early eighties. 63 Additionally,
EAL is now a major force in American legal theory and exerts a
dominant influence on contract law in particular."4 Today, it is very
difficult to find an American contract law monograph or law review
article not discussing EAL arguments. 65 EAL scholars have produced
59. See POSNER, supra note 10. Posner's 1973 text entered its seventh edition
in 2007.
60. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF
CONTRACT LAW 6 (1979) (indicating that inefficient rules "will be progressively
ignored and eventually forgotten" over time while the efficient rules remain);
Priest, supra note 8, at 65 (urging that the "tendency toward efficiency is a
characteristic of the common law process"); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common
Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 51 (1977) (discussing Posner's persuasive
argument regarding the relationship between the common law and economic
efficiency).
61. See, e.g., Roberto Pardolesi & Giuseppe Bellantuono, Law and Economics
in Italy, FINDLAW.COM, 244, 245 (1999), http://encyclo.findlaw.com/0345book.pdf
(asserting that EAL can be traced in Europe back to the 1961 work of Pietro
Trimarchi on strict liability, written around the same time Coase and Calabresi
were writing their respective articles). EALE "is the institutional response to the
increasing importance of the economic analysis of law in Europe[.] EALE was
founded in 1984 with the purpose of providing assistance to law and economics
scholars and bringing their scholarship to a wider audience, including policy
makers, legislators and judges." Mission Statement, EUR. ASS'N L. & ECON.,
http://law.haifa.ac.il/eale/site/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
62. See Symposium, The Place of Economics in Legal Education, 33 J. LEGAL
ED. 183 (1983) (documenting the early influence of Chicago-style EAL in U.S. law
schools).
63. See generally Richard A. Posner, A Reply to Some Recent Criticisms of the
Efficiency Theory of the Common Law, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 775 (1981); Daniel T.
Ostas, Postmodern Economic Analysis ofLaw: Extending the Pragmatic Visions of
Richard A. Posner, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 193 (1998).
64. See Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Why No "Efficient Breach" in the Civil Law?: A
Comparative Assessment of the Doctrine ofEfficient Breach of Contract, 55 AM. J.
COMP. L. 721, 722 ("Law and economics scholarship dominates much of the work
in antitrust, contracts, and torts, just to name a few areas.").
65. See Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three
Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 829 (2003) ("[M]any scholars
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a depth of literature analyzing EAL in contract law areas such as
breach, remedies, impossibility, and commercial impracticability.6 6
On the other hand, EAL historically was not a major theoretical
force in Europe, but recently has become more widely studied in
European and comparative law literature.6 7 Some of the conclusions
of EAL theory were more readily accepted while others failed to gain
widespread acceptance. For example, the theory of efficient
breach 6 -broadly embraced by EAL scholars in the United States-
was largely rejected in Europe.69 Professor Mattei offers an
explanation for this:
On policy grounds, moreover, it is not clear that efficient breaches should
be encouraged by a legal system, since in the long run the certainty of
property rights may be undermined. This is the reason why most legal
systems of the civil law tradition tend to resist efficient breaches (at least
in theory), and why they have traditionally assigned a more central role to
specific performance than has common law.70
would agree [that EAL] has become the dominant academic style of contract
theory.").
66. For a survey of EAL for contract law, see generally ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS (Boudewijn Bouckaeert & Gerrit De Gees eds., 2000); THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter Newman ed.,
1998).
67. See, e.g., Viktor Winkler, Some Realism About Rationalism: Economic
Analysis of Law in Germany, 6 GERM. L. J. 1033, 1033-34 (2005) (discussing the
publication in Germany of American EAL classics, which introduced German
legal scholars to the EAL debate). For a review of the uneven reception of EAL in
Europe and elsewhere in the late 1980s, see generally Christian Kirchner, The
Difficult Reception of Law and Economics in Germany, 11 INT'L REV. L. & ECON
277 (1991); Lionel Montagn6, Law and Economics in France, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 66, at 150; Shozo Ota, Law and Economics
in Japan: Hatching Stage, 11 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 301 (1991); Santos Pastor,
Law and Economics in Spain, 11 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 309 (1991).
68. See Posner, supra note 65, at 834-36 (discussing the evolution of academic
writings regarding efficient breach-the notion that sometimes breach of contract
is the most efficient result). This article returns to the issue of remedies, infra Part
II.A (addressing liquidated damages).
69. See Scalise, supra note 64, at 723 ("Encouraging breach of contract is
immoral, and civilian contract theory, which is pervaded with a concept of good
faith, properly refuses to recognize efficient breach."). Efficient breach theory has
also been criticized in the United States. See generally Daniel Friedmann, The
Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989); Ian R. Macneil, Efficient
Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947 (1982).
70. Ugo Mattei, The Comparative Law and Economics of Penalty Clauses in
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This view of efficient breach is consistent with those offered by
the critics of EAL in the United States.n Thus, European rejection of
the efficient breach theory is not itself evidence that economic
reasoning plays no role in civil law. Rather, the rejection suggests
that in civil law systems the comparative efficiency of specific
performance as an ordinary remedy-or any other contract rule for
that matter-can be assessed only on a rule by rule basis.7 2
Notwithstanding objections from abroad, EAL provides a means
of both understanding and critiquing the structure and content of the
CISG. In comparing alternative academic theories of contract law,
Eric Posner concludes that "[o]nly economic analysis seems to be on
solid footing."7 3 He recognizes the highly nuanced nature of EAL
theory and the difficulty of empirically testing many of its assertions,
but he nonetheless finds value in its approach. He writes, "[e]ven if
economic analysis cannot determine the magnitude of [economic]
costs and benefits, and the extent to which they offset or interact with
each other, the judge who knows about them is more likely to make a
wise decision than a judge who does not."74
This article organizes the economic logic of contract law with
reference to three central tenets of EAL: deferring to individual
autonomy, reducing transactions costs, and providing stability in
transactions. Although alternate schemes are possible, these tenets
provide a means of keeping the discussion tractable. Taken
collectively, they provide a basis for the comparative EAL analysis
of the CISG that follows.
Contracts, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 427, 429 (1995). Mattei further notes that the
insertion of penalty clauses and the shifting of risk increases the contract price and
does not discourage efficient breach. Id.
71. The normative argument against the theory is that breaches (efficient or
not) should not be aided by contract law given the moral basis of promise-keeping.
See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981).
72. See, e.g., Macneil, supra note 69, at 953 (analyzing the legitimacy of the
simple-efficient-breach conclusion that the specific performance rule is
inefficient).
73. See Posner, supra note 65, at 829-30 (comparing EAL with theories of
contract based on doctrine, philosophy, and cognitive psychology).
74. Id. at 854-55.
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1. Deferring to Individual Autonomy
Economic reasoning begins with the proposition that individuals
are in a better position to understand what is in their own best
interests than courts or governments." Individual preferences are
highly idiosyncratic and, presumably, individuals do not agree to an
exchange unless they feel that the agreement will advance their own
interests.76 Based on this assumption, a voluntary exchange, duly
consummated, puts both parties in a better situation.7 7 This pareto-
superior perspective of private exchange has been the primary tenet
of economic theory since Adam Smith.78 For Smith, the relative
wealth of nations depends on their degree of specialization.7 9
Specialization, in turn, depends on the establishment of free markets.
An efficient market facilitates private exchange, enables
specialization, and promotes economic growth. 0
75. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, And Market Illusions: The
Limits Of Law And Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309, 1309-10 (1986) (citing
Norman Frolich et al., Beyond Economic Man: Altruism, Egalitarianism and
Difference Maximizing, 28 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3 (1984)) (describing EAL's
foundational tenet that "man is a 'rational maximizer of self-interest"'). The view
of individual autonomy that motivates EAL is far from obvious. Many cognitive
scientists and postmodern philosophers insist that human preferences cannot be
separated from a cultural context. In other words, culture precedes the individual.
See generally JEFFREY REIMAN, JUSTICE AND MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1990)
(identifying the notion of autonomy with a "radical theory" of human agency).
Like neoclassical economics generally, EAL asserts the primacy of the individual.
See Anthony Ogus, What Legal Scholars Can Learn from Law and Economics, 79
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 383, 400 (2004) (discussing how EAL rests on the basic
assumption of individual autonomy).
76. See GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 3-4 (1996) (defining
"individual preferences" broadly so as to include habits, addictions, and even the
influence of parents, peers, and advertising).
77. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, ECONOMICS: BETWEEN PREDICTIVE SCIENCE
AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 26-29 (1987) (asserting that the potential for gains from
trade provides virtually the only lesson of economic theory).
78. See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 187 (7th ed.
1968) (noting that for Adam Smith, specialization fostered by the gains of trade
was practically the sole determinant of economic progress).
79. See id. at 187 (describing Adam Smith's belief that division of labor alone
"'accounts 'for the superior affluence and abundance commonly possessed even by
[the] lowest and most despised member of Civilized society"'). See generally
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. Chi. Press 1976) (1776) (providing the
seminal statement of classical economics).
80. See generally SMITH, supra note 79 (addressing the relationship between
2011] 387
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
The private laws of property, tort, and contract provide the legal
foundations of market transactions." Property law identifies
alienable entitlements; tort law protects such entitlements; and
contract law enables the exchange of those entitlements. Due
deference to individual autonomy not only respects the rights of
individuals but also promotes economic ends.8 2 In contract law, this
translates to a regime of free contracting.
No one has been more articulate in explaining the economics of
free contracting than the Austrian economist, Friedrich Hayek." To
Hayek, markets provide a means of coping with the dispersal of
information in society.8 4 Market actors carry idiosyncratic knowledge
as to how resources can best be used in society. Much of this
knowledge is difficult, if not impossible, to communicate. Hayek saw
two alternatives: central planning and free markets." He concluded
that central planning does not work. The government simply does not
hold sufficient information to direct the workings of a modem
economy.8 6
Free markets, according to Hayek, provide a means of addressing
information problems." Two contract principles underscore free
markets-freedom to contract and freedomfrom contract." Freedom
to contract means that individuals should be allowed to exchange
efficient markets, division of labor, and economic growth).
81. See generally JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM
(1924).
82. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L.
& ECON. 293, 293-95 (1975) (distinguishing between libertarian and utilitarian
justifications for the principle of deferring to individual autonomy).
83. See generally FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC
ORDER 107-18 (1948) (articulating the seminal argument in defense of
decentralized markets).
84. See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON.
REV. 519, 519-20 (1945) (lamenting that the issue with rational economic order is
that knowledge "never exists in concentrated or integrated form").
85. See id. at 520-21 (commenting that free markets still involve planning, but
that it is here divided among individuals).
86. See id. at 524 (urging that "communicating all . . . knowledge to a central
board which, after integrating all knowledge, issues its orders" is not effective).
87. See id (indicating that decentralization of economic order ensures that the
information will be timely used).
88. See generally Richard E. Speidel, The New Spirit of Contract, 2 J.L. &
COM. 193 (1982).
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their entitlements free from government restrictions." Freedom from
contract means that the government should not force individuals to
transfer entitlements without their consent.90 By insisting that each
party secure the consent of the other, a regime of free contracting
enables each party to signal their idiosyncratic preferences and
communicate private information. Free contracting enables
meaningful prices to emerge, which in turn can direct the workings
of a decentralized economy.
In short, the first economic tenet provides a presumption against
governmental intervention into the substance of private agreements.
Both forced transfers (required contract terms) and prohibited
transfers (contract terms that are prohibited by public policy)
frustrate the price system and erode efficiency. 91 Alternatively stated,
contract terms that reflect the subjective agreement of the parties
should be readily and strictly enforced.
2. Reducing Transaction Costs
Whereas deference to private autonomy provides an overarching
goal, tone, and orientation to EAL, the second tenet, reducing
transactions costs, provides the details. Market activities are
promoted by providing contract rules that reduce the costs of private
exchanges, including the costs of negotiation, performance, and
enforcement.9 2 In a seminal work articulating the economic logic of
contract law, Richard Posner and Anthony Kronman identify three
ways contract law can reduce transaction costs: (1) by providing a
remedy for breach, contract law encourages performance of mutually
agreed upon terms; (2) by offering standard terms, the law reduces
the need to negotiate; and (3) by punishing fraud and other
89. Id. at 195.
90. Id. at 196.
91. See id. at 195-96 (implying that the classical contract system, which,
among other things, requires mutual assent and promotes economic efficiency, is
the key to economic growth).
92. See David K. Lutz, The Law and Economics of Securities Fraud: Section
29(A) and the Non-Reliance Clause, 29 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 803, 818-19 (2004)
(suggesting that efficient rules would not only assist parties in codifying the
appropriate rights and obligations in a contract but also help predict the
interpretation of such terms, particularly in light of the fact that the conflicting
economic interests of contracting parties often encourage them to leave gaps in the
contract's scope).
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improprieties during contract negotiations, the law deters misleading
conduct.93
The first economic function of contract law is to determine which
transfers will be enforced and which will not. Deference to autonomy
suggests that the court should enforce every transfer subjectively
agreed to by the affected parties and withhold enforcement of any
transfer not subjectively understood.94 As a practical matter,
however, it is difficult to resolve or prove subjective claims of intent.
Hence, courts must look for objective manifestations as a surrogate
for subjective intent. 95
Most contract rules address this evidentiary function. For example,
rules that require specificity in contracts, require a writing, demand
conformity with offer and acceptance rules, or inquire into the
presence of fraud all provide objective evidence of subjective intent.
The inevitable slippage-the divergence between subjective and
objective intent produced by the fact that objective evidence is
second best or indirect evidence of subjective intent-in these
evidentiary surrogates results in both over-enforcement and under-
enforcement of contractual language.9 6 Over-enforcement occurs
when courts enforce transfers not reflective of any subjective
agreement. Under-enforcement results when courts refuse to enforce
agreements ex post that were subjectively understood ex ante. The
second tenet of EAL suggests that rules should minimize the sum of
over-enforcement and under-enforcement costs.97
93. KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 60, at 4-5.
94. But cf id. at 5 (indicating, however, that enforcement of a contract even
when the terms may not be agreed upon by both parties discourages carelessness in
the contractual process).
95. See Randy E. Bamett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
269, 272 (1986) ("It has long been recognized that a system of contractual
enforcement would be unworkable if it adhered to a will theory requiring a
subjective inquiry into the putative promisor's intent."). See generally LARRY A.
DIMATTEO, CONTRACT THEORY: THE EVOLUTION OF CONTRACTUAL INTENT
(1998) (providing an historical analysis of the evolution and fabrication of the
reasonable person standard).
96. See generally Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The
Reasonable Person Standard and the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S.C. L. REV.
293 (1997) (examining the divergence of the objective theory of contract and the
subjectivity involved in its application).
97. See KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 60, at 5 (observing that "only a
contract that involves a meeting of the minds satisfies an economist's definition of
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Contract rules also reduce transaction costs by providing default
terms that help fill the gaps in contractual language. It is not cost
effective, or even possible, for parties to account for all contractual
contingencies ex ante. Contractual activity, like life, is simply too
complex and multifaceted. Contract law responds with standard
terms.9 8 EAL suggests that these terms should reflect customary
expectations so as to facilitate subjective agreement.9 9 Difficulties
arise when the parties do not share similar customs. In such
situations, EAL supports a preference for industry customs, so as to
provide an incentive for all parties to learn the language and usages
of the particular trade.'10
EAL also generates insights into the substantive content of default
terms. Most contract or default terms allocate risk between the
contracting parties. Both parties benefit if these costs are allocated to
the party who can best absorb them at a lower cost."0 ' Such an
allocation generates an exchange surplus that the parties can divide.
EAL suggests that default rules reflect this cost reduction logic.10 2
For example, an implied warranty of merchantability assigns the risk
of a faulty product to the merchant seller, the party best able to take
precautions and to insure against non-conforming products.
Similarly, liability for damage to goods in shipment typically rests
with the common carrier, the party best able to take efficient
precautions and insure against loss.
Finally, contract law reduces transaction costs by deterring fraud
and other negotiation improprieties. To this end, the law must
a value-maximizing exchange"). Kronman and Posner note, however, that EAL
allows for "rules designed to prevent people from misleading others into thinking
that they have a contract with them; hence both the subjective and objective
theories have a place in contract law." Id.
98. See Barnett, supra note 16, at 823-25 (providing analysis of the gap filling
function of contract law, which reads into a contract default terms where the
contract is otherwise silent).
99. Ostas, supra note 63, at 232.
100. Id.
101. See Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related
Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 89
(1977) (characterizing the economic efficiency of contracting in terms of
maximizing of the aggregate value of an exchange).
102. See Ostas, supra note 63, at 232 (stating that, in general, EAL looks to use
the law to lessen transaction costs).
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balance two forms of welfare-diminishing opportunism. 10 3 On one
hand, one party could mislead the other into agreeing to a transfer the
latter party did not fully understand. On the other hand, the party
asserting the fraud may be trying to avoid a bad bargain. Both types
of opportunism generate costs. An efficient contract law system
minimizes the sum of these costs. Such calculations inform the laws
of fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence, duress, mutual mistake,
and unconscionability.10 4
In sum, the logic of cost reduction provides a powerful heuristic.
Although the logic can- be complex and multi-faceted, EAL benefits
from sharpness of focus. Virtually every contract rule impacts
transaction costs, thus providing a useful benchmark for comparative
efficiency analysis.
3. Providing Stability
For contract rules to accomplish desired instrumental effects, the
content of the rules needs to be effectively communicated to the
affected parties. EAL "views law as an incentive structure" that
directs business conduct.o' The importance of predictability and
stability in the law is particularly important in the international
context of the CISG. Transacting parties need to be alerted to gaps in
the CISG and to interpretations developed by CISG tribunals.
The third tenet of EAL emphasizes the need for legal predictability
and stability in international transactions. In a number of areas, the
CISG failed to select a stable rule simply by not covering certain
areas of contract law within its jurisdictional scope.10 6 One area of
non-selective inefficiency is the duty to negotiate in good faith. The
duty of good faith in pre-contractual negotiations is unknown to the
common law.107 One efficiency argument in favor of the duty of good
103. Daniel T. Ostas, Predicting Unconscionability Decisions: An Economic
Model and an Empirical Test, 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 535, 551-52 (1992).
104. See id. (charting the factors and implications in evaluating the negotiation
process of contracts).
105. Ostas, supra note 63, at 213.
106. See Carlo H. Mastellone, Sales-Related Issues Not Covered by the CISG:
Assignment, Set-off Statute ofLimitations, Etc., Under Italian Law, 5 VINDOBONA
J. INT'L COM. L. & ARB. 143, 147-52 (2001) (presenting an aggregate analysis
based on Italian, German, Argentine, and other states parties' case law).
107. See Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private
Autonomy: Lon Fuller's "Consideration and Form", 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 143-
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faith in negotiation is that the ability to negotiate in bad faith creates
incentives for opportunism and moral hazard as well as results in
adverse selection effects. Additionally, the increase in transaction
costs leads to a suboptimal number of concluded contracts. However,
the CISG does not recognize such a requirement even though it
adopts the duty of good faith in the interpretation of CISG rules."os
The fact that the CISG contains numerous gaps in the scope of its
coverage causes a number of problems. One commentator states,
"[b]ecause uniform rules are lacking, similarly situated parties
sometimes receive vastly different results; the disparities undermine
the purpose of the CISG." 09 The abdication of authority over areas
clearly within the body of sales law makes the CISG less
comprehensive and more inefficient than a law drafted with fewer
intended gaps. That being said, this article is primarily focused on
determining the relative efficiency of the rules found in the CISG.
The relative or comparative efficiency analysis is accomplished by
comparing the rule options available to the drafters with the rule that
was actually incorporated into the CISG. The options available can
be described as those provided by competing civil and common law
rules, a compromised or modified version of one of those rules, or
the creation of a new, system-neutral rule. Ultimately, the
comparative efficiency analysis is based on whether the chosen rule
44 (2000) (indicating that the civil law's good faith doctrine tends to bind parties to
contracts in situations where the common law would not recognize an enforceable
agreement). The civil law also assesses contractual damages for bad faith, allowing
plaintiffs to recover reliance damages under the tort doctrine of culpa en
contrahendo. Id. Even though the common law rejects a duty to negotiate in good
faith, more and more courts have allowed the recovery of reliance damages when
negotiations include a "preliminary agreement." Professors Schwartz and Scott
have argued that such recovery is economically efficient. They argue that
preliminary agreements allow for "the realization of a socially efficient
opportunity." Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and
Preliminary Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 662 (2007). Therefore, they
conclude that "contract law should encourage relation-specific investments in
preliminary agreements by awarding the promisee his verifiable reliance if the
promisor has strategically delayed investment." Id.
108. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 7 (providing that in the interpretation of the
CISG, "regard is to be given to ... the observance of good faith in international
trade").
109. John Y. Gotanda, Using the UNIDROIT Principles to Fill Gaps in the
CISG 2 (Villanova University School of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory
Working Article No. 2007-18), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1019277.
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provides a stable or predictable outcome when applied to similarly
situated circumstances or fact patterns.
II. ASSESSING THE EFFICIENCY OF CISG RULES
EAL provides a powerful heuristic with which to assess the CISG.
Part II of this article begins with an assessment of the CISG
treatment of liquidated damages. The CISG failed to take a stand on
liquidated damages-and the enforceability of penalties-leaving
this issue to national legal systems.o10 This is an example of non-
selective inefficiency. Part II then turns to the evidentiary rules
embodied in the statute of frauds and the parol evidence rule. In this
area, the CISG chose to follow the civil law.'' Part II concludes with
a discussion of CISG rules pertaining to contract interpretation and
contract formation-areas in which the CISG drafters tended to
fabricate compromise positions.
A. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
The voiding of all penalty clauses in the common law" 2 produced
a significant amount of EAL literature.' 13 Commentators are split
110. Katz, supra note 40, at 387.
111. See Peter L. Fitzgerald, The International Contracting Practices Survey
Project: An Empirical Study of the Value and Utility of the United Nations
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the Unidroit Principles
of International Commercial Contracts to Practitioners, Jurists, and Legal
Academics in the United States, 27 J.L. & COM. 1, 22 (2008) (indicating the CISG's
lack of a writing requirement in Article 11 or a parol evidence rule in Article 8);
Anthony J. McMahon, Note, Differentiating Between Internal and External Gaps
in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A
Proposed Method for Determining "Governed By" in the Context of Article 7(2),
44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 992, 1027 (2006) ("[T]he parol evidence rule and the
statute of frauds, though well entrenched in many common law countries, do not
exist and are likely not to be understood in civil law countries.").
112. See U.C.C. § 2-718 (1) (1977) ("A term fixing unreasonably large
liquidated damages is void as a penalty."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1981) ("A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated
damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty.").
113. See, e.g., Aristides N. Hatzis, Civil Contract Law and Economic
Reasoning-An Unlikely Pair?, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF EUROPEAN CODES AND
CONTRACT LAW 181 (Stefan Grundmann & Martin Schauer eds., 2006) (arguing
that the common law's lack of penalty clauses is inefficient); Aristides N. Hatzis,
Having the Cake and Eating It Too: Efficient Penalty Clauses in Common and
Civil Contract Law, 22 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 381, 381-82 (2003) [hereinafter
Efficient Penalty Clauses] (discussing the civil law versus common law with
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between: (1) those who see the non-enforcement of penalty clauses
as a facilitation of efficient breach and prevention of moral hazard
problems, (2) those who argue that not enforcing such clauses
undermines contracts as an allocation of risk mechanism, creates
barriers to entry, and is antithetical to general economic theory,"l4
and (3) those who would like to see a bifurcation of the concept of
penalties into efficient and inefficient penalties."'5 The common law
has long seen penalties as a coercive means of ensuring
performance-either perform or be punished. Under this rationale,
the penalty violates the principle of compensatory damages that
underlay common law remedies.
The second approach noted above asserts that the common law
needs to change and allow for the enforcement of penalties. This
view argues that common law damages are under-compensatory,
allowing the breaching party to obtain more than its fair share of the
subsequent surplus.1 16 In addition, general economic theory holds
that rational contracting parties will negotiate efficient contract
terms. Therefore, the insertion of a penalty clause will likely be
offset by a price adjustment. It also allows a contracting party to be
more competitive by using the penalty clause as a signal of its
reliability.' Finally, the penalty clause assigns the risk of
respect to enforcement of penalty clauses); Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of
Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. Bus. L.J.
633 (2001) (identifying possible issues regarding risk allocation stemming from a
party's inability to negotiate for the inclusion of enforceable penalty clauses).
114. See, e.g., Efficient Penalty Clauses, supra note 113, at 392 (stating
economists' critique of the common law penalty doctrine as inefficient because,
among other things, it rejects allocation of risk by the parties and leads to
inefficient breaches).
115. E.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties
and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a
Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 554 (1977); Andrew Ham, The
Rule Against Penalties in Contract: An Economic Perspective, 17 MELB. U. L.
REv. 649 (1990); Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Efficiency Implications of Penalties and
Liquidated Damages, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 147 (1984).
116. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Penalties as Rational Response to Bargaining
Irrationality, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 883, 909-10 (arguing that the common law
of liquidated damages infringes on the freedom to contract and that penalty clauses
merely reflect the real economic value of damages that the law fails to realize).
117. But see id at 892-95 (summarizing the outcome of a behavioral decision
study, which found that volunteering to insert a penalty clause did not produce a
statistically significant increase to the inserting party's perceived reliability).
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nonperformance to the most efficient insurer. These arguments view
the use of penalty clauses as efficient deal-making devices and the
failure to enforce them as an inequitable windfall to the breaching
party.118
Comparatively, commentators in the third camp-those who seek
a bifurcation-essentially assert that the civil law correctly adopts a
presumption in favor of the enforcement of penalty clauses. The
presumption of enforceability can be overcome only if the penalty is
determined to be manifestly or grossly excessive."' A similar result
would be achieved in American law if the rule against penalties was
expunged and the problem of excessive penalties was policed under
the doctrine of unconscionability.12 0
The Council of Europe's Resolution 78(3) on Penal Clauses
adopts the civil approach that the penalty amount "may be reduced
by the court when it is manifestly excessive."121 Another
amalgamation of civil and common law is the Principles of
European Contract Law,12 2 which was a project envisioned by the
Commission on European Contract Law to illuminate the common
(and best) elements of the two legal systems. In the area of penalty
clauses, the civil approach is understood as the better option-Article
9.509(1) states that "the aggrieved party ... shall be awarded that
sum [penalty] irrespective of its actual loss.1l23 The only limitation
on the enforcement of penalty clauses is a reduction in the amount of
the penalty if it is deemed to be "grossly excessive in relation to the
loss resulting from the nonperformance and the other
circumstances."1 2 4 The Comment to Article 9.509 provides an
118. Cf id. at 889 (arguing that "many penalty clauses are efficient and should
be strictly enforced").
119. See id. at 916-17 (asserting that the policing doctrines of unconscionability,
duress, and misrepresentation are at once efficient and capable of protecting
against manifestly excessive penalties).
120. See KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 60, at 94-95 (defining the doctrine of
unconscionability as a tool to "protect against fraud, duress and incompetence,
without demanding specific proof of any of them").
121. Council of Europe, Comm. of Ministers, Res. 78(3) on Penal Clauses in
Civil Law, art. 7 (1978).
122. COMM'N OF EUR. CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT
LAW: PARTS I AND II (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 2000) [hereinafter
PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW].
123. Id. at 453.
124. Id.
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efficiency rationale for the rule: the parties want to avoid "the
difficulty, delay and expense involved in proving the amount of loss
in a claim for unliquidated damages."1 25 The comparative efficiency
analysis becomes more complicated when the differences among
civil law systems are considered. Although most civil law systems
limit the non-breaching party to the stipulated damages provided in
the penalty clause, German law allows the non-breaching party to
make a claim for damages in addition to the stipulated amount.126
The latter approach defeats the efficiency gains attributed to the
avoidance of litigation. The best rationale for this allowance is the
case where the stipulated amount is set too low and is, thus, under-
compensatory.
To summarize, the common law holds that all penalty clauses are
unenforceable and provides a void-only remedy. The civil law holds
that mutually agreed upon penalties are fully enforceable unless they
are deemed to be excessive. Further, the civil law encourages courts
to reform the clause instead of voiding it. General economic theory
argues that the law is most efficient when enforcing express terms
because the contracting parties are in the best position to determine
the valuation of such terms.12 7 The argument here against efficient
breach theory is that not all breaches are efficient.128 In practice, it is
rather difficult to determine if a breach is efficient since a sine qua
non requirement for the efficiency of the breach is full compensation
to the promisee, and it is difficult for the courts to determine what
constitutes "full compensation" in a given case because subjective
valuations are difficult to measure or quantify. In contrast, a penalty
clause gives a clear indication of the value that the promisee places
on the performance; the fee paid for such clauses can be invested by
the likely breaching party to ensure timely performance, and
penalties protect sunk costs. 129
125. Id. at 454.
126. Id. at 455 n.2.
127. See supra Part I.B. 1 (discussing the efficiency gains generated by deferring
to individual autonomy).
128. See Macneil, supra note 69, at 950-53 (positing that when contract
nonperformance is the most efficient result, breach is but one of many ways to
achieve that result).
129. See DiMatteo, supra note 116, at 902 (noting that subjective valuations,
like liquidated damages, are subject to the "limits of cognition"); Tess Wilkinson-
Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment,
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Unfortunately, the CISG abdicated its coverage of this contentious
area of law by not enacting rules dealing with the enforceability of
liquidated damages or penalties. The result is the allocation of the
issue to conflicting national laws. 130 In the case of the common law,
it means delegation to a hopelessly conflictive and chaotic
jurisprudence.131 In such areas as penalties and specific performance,
the CISG missed the opportunity to harmonize conflicting areas of
law. 13 2 As a result, from the perspective of global efficiency, the
CISG is less efficient then it could be.
B. EVIDENTIARY RULES
The negotiators of the CISG faced what seemed to be an
insurmountable conflict between those countries preferring the
formal requirement of writing and those recognizing the full
enforceability of oral agreements or less formal writings.13 3 Civil law
countries fall into the latter category, 13 4 and while the United
Kingdom disposed of the statute of frauds,'35 it remains a
requirement in the United States for a number of categories of
contracts, including the sale of goods.13 6 The CISG adopted the civil
law approach of no writing requirement with one important
108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 644 (2010) (explaining that penalty clauses are a means of
facilitating efficient agreements and reflect the parties' judgments as to a
cost/benefit analysis of the bargain).
130. See, e.g., Gotanda, supra note 109 (suggesting the use of the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts to fill the gap left by the CISG).
131. See DiMatteo, supra note 113, at 655-75 (attributing this chaos to the
common law's preoccupation with balancing freedom of contract principles with
the equities of each case).
132. See Peter A. Piliounis, The Remedies of Specific Performance, Price
Reduction and Additional Time (Nachfrist) Under the CISG: Are These
Worthwhile Changes or Additions to English Sales Law?, 12 PACE INT'L L. REV. 1,
17-19 (2000) (arguing that the CISG missed the opportunity to broaden instances
where specific performance is granted, and pointing out that the PRINCIPLES OF
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, supra note 122, include one such broader specific
performance provision requiring a court to award specific performance unless on
of the enumerated exceptions are met).
133. Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of
International Sales Law, 25 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 446, 460-61 (2005).
134. McMahon, supra note 111, at 1027.
135. Asa Markel, American, English, and Japanese Warranty Law Compared:
Should the U.S. Reconsider Her Article 95 Declaration to the CISG?, 21 PACE
INT'L L. REV. 163, 190 n.170 (2009).
136. U.C.C. § 2-201 (1977).
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compromise. The compromise allows countries to opt out of the no
writing requirement when ratifying the convention.137 As a result, a
number of countries, mostly former Soviet-affiliated countries,
retained their national writing requirements.138 Interestingly, the
United States elected not to opt out of the no writing rule. 3 1
1. Writing Requirement
Before analyzing the efficiency of requiring a written
instrument as a prerequisite for contract enforceability, a comment
regarding the "opt out" provisions of Articles 12 and 96 is needed. A
system that allows for such opting out is inherently inefficient. 4 0 The
presence of alternative, conflicting rules in any law increases
uncertainty and transaction costs. To allow an affirmative defense in
a contract dispute based on a failure to provide a written instrument
adds to the uncertainty of international transactions. Where a custom
of oral agreement, honored internationally, is trumped by the
137. CISG, supra note 1, arts. 12, 96.
138. See Status: 1980 - United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, U.N. COMMIssION ON INT'L TRADE L.,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/salegoods/1980CISG-status.ht
ml (listing the following countries as opting out of the no writing rule: Argentina,
Armenia, Chile, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
and Paraguay).
139. Id. (indicating that the U.S. instead exercised its Article 95 rights to declare
that it is not bound by paragraph 1(b) of Article 1). The U.S.'s accession to Article
12 illustrates the difference between formal and operative rules. Despite the
U.C.C.'s retention of a writing requirement in practice, it has been greatly
diminished by the lessening of the threshold for "writing" and "signature," and the
existence of numerous exceptions, such as the written confirmation rule and
purchases of specially manufactured goods. See Larry A. DiMatteo, The CISG and
the Presumption of Enforceability: Unintended Contractual Liability in
International Business Dealings, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 111, 166-67 (1997)
(discussing the rigidness of the U.C.C.'s statute of frauds with respect to oral
agreements and informal letter agreements, but also acknowledging exceptions to
the rule). These differences of formal law and law in practice, and the narrowing of
evidentiary thresholds, provide insight into the possible inefficiencies of such
formalities.
140. See Gillette & Scott, supra note 133, at 454 (arguing that the ability to opt-
out of certain provisions of uniform international sales law undermines the benefits
of the standardization as it allows the parties to draft their own party-specific
provisions); Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unication and Harmonization in
International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 743 (1999) (arguing that the
poor degree of harmonization in the CISG makes it of limited benefit to
contracting parties).
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parochial formality requirements of national legal systems, the
efficiency gains attributed to a uniform system of rules are
diminished.14 1
There are contrasting views of the efficiency of the writing
requirement. Some argue that requiring a writing promotes
transactional certainty and consequently reduces dispute resolution
costs. 142 Allowing oral testimony to establish a contract creates a
moral hazard, as parties are incentivized to fabricate obligations
where none were intended.14 3 However, when the parties believe that
a writing is not necessary, a legal regime's requirement of a writing
increases transaction costs. 144 Sometimes the negotiation and drafting
costs of placing a contract in writing exceed the benefits from
entering the contract and a mutually beneficial trade is forgone. 4 5 In
addition, by requiring a writing, an opportunistic party may seek to
nullify a bona fide oral agreement and escape a contractual
obligation. 146
Economic critique of the writing requirement ultimately depends
on whether the benefits of requiring a writing-reducing fraudulent
allegations of oral contracts-exceed the costs-increased drafting
expense and propensity to nullify bone fide transactions. Enforcing a
141. Cf Gillette & Scott, supra note 133, at 452-53 (asserting that because states
have different social, political, and legal structures, it is "entirely unrealistic" to
expect uniform rules and that over time litigation within such states will yield non-
uniform interpretations as to certain provisions, resulting in a failed standard
language).
142. See, e.g., KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 60, at 94-95 (noting that the
statute of frauds and parol evidence rules serve a legitimate end in controlling and
preventing fraud by limiting instances where an undeserving party may win in a
dispute).
143. E.g., Eric A. Posner, Norms, Formalities, and the Statute of Frauds: A
Comment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1971, 1976-77 (1996).
144. Id. at 1977-78. Eric Posner describes two expensive outcomes that may
occur as a result of parties being unaware of the statute of frauds, codified in
Section 2-201 of the U.C.C.-either (1) "courts may enforce section 2-201 and
allow promisors to escape their contract obligations" or (2) "courts may strain to
evade section 2-201, thus holding promisors to their bargain, but in the process
creating complexity and uncertainty in the law." Id
145. Id. at 1979.
146. See Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and
the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 518-19 (1987) (providing
commentary that criticizes the writing requirement as promoting, rather than
discouraging, opportunistic conduct).
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false allegation of an oral contract violates freedom from contract,
while failing to enforce a legitimate exchange, violates freedom to
contract.14 7 In accord with this logic, the civil law entrusts courts to
ferret out bogus claims of oral contracts, while preserving the
efficiency of permitting parties to transact without prior written
documentation. 148 The CISG follows this rule as well.14 9
2. Parol Evidence Rule
Just as important as the issue of whether to require a writing is the
issue of whether a writing limits the admissibility of extrinsic
evidence to supplement or contradict the written instrument. Civil
law countries, like France, do not make a distinction between oral
and written contracts with regard to the admissibility of extrinsic
information.' Generally, extrinsic evidence is freely admitted in the
interpretation of contracts. In contrast, the common law, especially in
the United States, relates the integration of an agreement into a
written contract to the inadmissibility of extrinsic evidence. The
rationale of the sanctity of a written contract is protected by the
common law's parol evidence rule and the statute of frauds."' The
parol evidence rule holds that if a writing was intended as a final
integration of an agreement, whether or not a writing is required
under the statute of frauds, extrinsic evidence is barred if it would
147. Numerous law and economic commentators tend to favor the civil law rule
dispensing with the need for a writing. See, e.g., Michael Braunstein, Remedy,
Reason, and the Statute of Frauds: A Critical Economic Analysis, 1989 UTAH L.
REv. 383, 422-38 (1989) (arguing for a repeal of both the writing requirement and
the statute of frauds because they tend to hamper economic efficiency); Mark
Cantora, Note, The CISG After Medellin v. Texas: Do U.S. Businesses Have It? Do
They Want It?, 8 J. INT'L Bus. & L. 111, 127 (2009) ("The statute of frauds as used
in the U.C.C. is at best superfluous, and at worst, an inefficient default rule.").
148. See Wiseman, supra note 146, at 519 (discussing the modification of
earlier versions of the statute of frauds by Karl Llewellyn, who added the
"merchant rule" to accommodate the traditional practice of merchants confirming
deals over the phone and not necessarily in writing).
149. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 11 ("A contract of sale need not be concluded
in or evidenced by writing .. ).
150. Stefan Vogenauer, Interpretation of Contracts: Concluding Comparative
Observations, in CONTRACT TERMS 123, 135 (Andrew Burrows & Edwin Peel
eds., 2007) (indicating that both Germany and France do not place limits on the
admissibility of extrinsic evidence).
151. Id. at 135-39.
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contradict the plain meaning of the written agreement. 15 2 In reality,
American courts often avoid the parol evidence bar by declaring
contract language to be ambiguous and therefore, parol evidence is
admitted to clarify, but not to contradict the contract.' The CISG
rejects any limitation on the use of extrinsic evidence.154 The
question relevant to the current undertaking is whether the CISG's
rejection of a writing requirement and restrictions on extrinsic
evidence were efficient choices.
EAL scholarship supports the certainty provided by written
agreements and the plain meaning interpretation of them. The
protection of written agreements through a rigid parol evidence rule
is seen as enhancing the certainty of written agreements." However,
the certainty protection provided by the parol evidence rule is
partially muted by the fact that there are different versions of the
rule.156 Professor Linzer explains the variations:
152. E.g., Hila Keren, Textual Harassment: A New Historicist Reappraisal of
the Parol Evidence Rule with Gender in Mind, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POLY &
L. 251, 251 (2005). The common law's parol evidence rule dates back four hundred
years, and under the rule, prior inconsistent writings or witness testimony
regarding contract negotiations constitutes inadmissible evidence when there is an
integrated contract or where the issue relates to the written terms of a partially
integrated contract. Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L. J. 603,
603 (1944). One commentator argues that Lord Coke's reason for formulating the
rule was his pro-market orientation: "Coke seemed interested in the contractual
tool itself, the one used by purchasers and farmers. The danger he visualized was
in all likelihood the danger of chaos-of never-ending clashes and contradictions
between written contracts and oral promises, between legal texts and the human
contexts that threaten to change their meaning." Keren, supra.
153. See Vogenauer, supra note 150, at 138 (making the distinction between
admissibility and weight in contract breach cases and stressing that although
extrinsic evidence may be admissible, it does not follow that it will be controlling).
154. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 8 (allowing in contract interpretation an
analysis of intent and conduct of the parties, with due consideration for all
circumstances of the contract, including negotiations, practice between the parties,
and industry usages and standards).
155. See Peter Linzer, The Comfort of Certainty: Plain Meaning and the Parol
Evidence Rule, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 799, 802 (2002) (asserting that a "strict parol
evidence rule combined with a strong view of plain meaning" provides predictive
stability and comfort).
156. See Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law: A
Comparative Analysis of Common Law and Code Methodologies, in THE
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 149,
167-69 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000) (noting the common law's
general preference for textualism despite the U.C.C.'s and Second Restatement of
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What we call the parol evidence rule is better thought of as a spectrum.
Some courts, old and new, presume that almost all documents, however
skimpy or haphazard, represent the final word. Others will not go that far,
but still apply Williston's famous "four corners rule" strictly, rejecting
extrinsic evidence unless questions of integration and ambiguity of
meaning are patent on the face of the writing. Other courts, although they
recite the four corners approach, actually require the facial uncertainty to
be much less palpable, and admit extrinsic evidence more readily. Still
others allow extrinsic evidence to show non-integration and ambiguity
themselves, and some even go as far as the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts and admit evidence to show meaning without regard to
ambiguity. 157
In some instances, the parol evidence rule may be "hard" for
purposes of determining the completeness of the written contract and
"soft" for determining whether an ambiguity exists in the contract.158
A purely formalist interpretive methodology focused on the four-
corners of a writing blunts efforts to uncover the true intention of the
parties. 159 EAL holds that the parties are the best evaluators of value
and preferences.160 As such, extrinsic evidence that offers insight into
the parties' true intentions provides the most efficient interpretation
of contractual terms.
Contracts' codification of contextual interpretation).
157. Linzer, supra note 155, at 805-06 (citations omitted). Linzer further notes
that "Eric Posner, after sketching out what he called the 'hard-[parol evidence
rule]' (roughly the Williston, four-corners, plain meaning approach) and the 'soft-
[parol evidence rule]' (roughly that of Corbin and the Second Restatement of
Contracts), cautioned his readers that . . . 'reality is [far] more complex than the
stylized versions of the parol evidence rule developed for the purpose of
analysis."' Id. at 807 (quoting Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain
Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L.
REv. 533, 534-40 (1998)).
158. See Linzer, supra note 155, at 805-07 (offering an enumerated
characterization of the spectrum, moving from most restrictive to more liberal
regimes: (1) document regarded as a final integration (legal formalism); (2) "four
corners rule" with patent ambiguity exception (Williston); (3) broader
interpretation of what constitutes ambiguity; (4) liberal use of extrinsic evidence to
show ambiguity or non-integration; and (5) use of extrinsic evidence to uncover
meaning even without ambiguity (contextualism)).
159. See id. at 838-39 (explaining that the formalist approach does not consider
context, credibility, linguistic sensibility, and many other contextual factors
relevant to discerning intent).
160. See id at 838 ("[W]e should opt for the parties' intentions, discerned from
their words, read in the context of all relevant evidence, extrinsic or not.").
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The CISG rejects the common law's parol evidence rule.161
The CISG evidence regime provides for the liberal admission of
parol and other types of extrinsic evidence as well as allows the use
of "vague" or open forms of contracting. 162 Professor Triantis argued
that vagueness in written contracts can serve certain economic
purposes such as lowering transaction costs by lowering the costs of
negotiation and the writing of contracts.163 Judge Posner also
acknowledged the benefits of a certain degree of vagueness in
written contracts.'6 He writes, "[d]eliberate ambiguity may be a
necessary condition of making the contract; the parties may be
unable to agree on certain points yet be content to take their chances
on being able to resolve them, with or without judicial intervention,
should the need arise."' 6 In the end, Judge Posner speaks in favor of
a modified "four corners" rule that "allow[s] extrinsic ambiguity to
161. Rod N. Andreason, Note, MCC-Marble Ceramic Center: The Parol
Evidence Rule and Other Domestic Law Under the Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, 1999 BYU L. REv. 350, 357-64. It is debated as to
whether the parol evidence rule is a rule of civil procedure, and thus American
courts may use it in applying the CISG, or a rule of substantive contract law. The
better argument is that it is the latter and thus cannot be used in the application of
the CISG. See id at 357-59 (quoting MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr. v. Ceramic Nuova
d' Agostino, S.p.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 1388-89 (11th Cir. 1998)) (reasoning that the
parol evidence rule is substantive because it does not stop parties from using an
"undesirable" means to prove a fact, but instead stops parties from attempting to
prove a fact in the first place).
162. But cf George G. Triantis, The Efficiency of Vague Contract Terms: A
Response to the Schwartz-Scott Theory of U.C.C. Article 2, 62 LA. L. REv. 1065,
1067 (2002) (expressing confusion over parties' willingness to agree to vague
terms because such vague standards of contracting create uncertainty and risk the
high cost of judicial interpretation).
163. See id. at 1071 (stating that the cost of taking the time and energy to specify
each possible foreseeable future state of the world has the potential to exceed the
gains from doing so).
164. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation,
83 TEX. L. REv. 1581, 1587 (2005) (indentifying a benefit of having flexible
contractual language-it allows for adaptability of the language to future
unforeseen situations-but also noting that the cost of such flexibility is
vagueness). Additionally, gap-filling, under the CISG and U.C.C., for material
terms such as price may be cost effective because of the fungible nature of goods
and the relative ease of determining market price, whereas such gap filling may be
too burdensome for other types of terms. See id. at 1587-88 (suggesting, however,
that the cost saving would not be significant-and the burden shouldered by a
court in determining a "reasonable price" might be prohibitive).
165. Id. at 1583.
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be shown only by objective evidence."l 66 Evidence of custom or
trade usage is an example of objective evidence.167
In sum, the use of economic logic to assess the parol evidence
rule is highly nuanced. Common law courts use the rule to protect
the integrity of integrated writings, while simultaneously permitting
extrinsic evidence to explain ambiguities.168 By contrast, most civil
law systems and the CISG allow parol evidence, trusting the courts
to assess its probative value. 6 9 While economic theory generally
supports the common law approach, the distinction between the
common law and civil law approaches to extrinsic evidence should
not be over-stated. Given the numerous exceptions to the rule, the
two systems often reach the same results. The use of extrinsic
evidence will be further studied in the next section's coverage of
contract interpretation.
C. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
Judge Posner notes that although the literature involving the
economic analysis of contract law is deep in the areas of contract
formation and remedies, the economic analysis of contract
interpretation is more superficial and abstract.17 0 Nonetheless, he
asserts that contract interpretation is better managed through an
economic analysis.171
Contract interpretation deals with three fundamental scenarios: (1)
contractual incompleteness, (2) contractual ambiguity, and (3)
situations in which the parties seek ex ante to establish rules of
166. Id. at 1598. Posner further clarifies that, "[b]y 'objective,' I mean to
exclude a party's self-serving testimony that cannot be verified . . . ." Id. at 1598-
99.
167. See id. at 1600 ("Were evidence of trade usage barred in contract litigation,
parties to contracts would be driven to include additional detail in their contracts . .
. . The need to add this detail would increase the costs of negotiation and drafting,
while the benefits would be realized only in the small minority of cases that would
result in a legal dispute.").
168. See generally Linzer, supra note 155, at 805-08.
169. See supra Part II.B.2; CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(3) (indicating that
consideration should be given to relevant circumstances surrounding the formation
of the contract-such as negotiations, practices between the parties, and customary
usages-when interpreting a contract).
170. Posner, supra note 164, at 1581.
171. See id. ("I shall try to show that economics can be of considerable help in
understanding the problems involved in interpreting contracts.").
2011] 405
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
interpretation that will apply ex post.17 2 Before discussing these
scenarios, the next subsection will address the more abstract question
of the efficiency of the objective and subjective theories of contract
interpretation.
1. Objective Versus Subjective Theories ofInterpretation
The two broad theories of contract interpretation are illustrated
by the civil law's adoption of a subjective (agreement in fact)
approach and the common law's embrace of the objective (external
manifestation of assent) approach.17 3 Article 1156 of the Code Civile
of 1804, as well as Section 133 of the Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch of
1900, require a search for "the common intention of the contracting
parties."l74
The divergence between subjective and objective theories of
interpretation is not as profound in practice.1 5 The subjective theory
in the civil law gives way when the objective meaning is clear and
the subjective obscure. Thus, Articles 1157 through 1164 of the Code
Civile acknowledge that the path to subjective understanding is
through more objective benchmarks, such as the nature or purpose of
the contract, trade usage and custom, and "the context of the
contractual document."17 6 The German law more expressly abandons
subjectivism in favor of the reasonable person interpretive
methodology. 17 7 The CISG adopts a modified subjective approach.17 1
The CISG interpretive methodology, as expressed in its Articles 8
and 9, rejects the formalist approach to interpretation associated with
the brand of objectivism that focuses solely on the written words of a
172. See infra Parts II.C.2-3.
173. See Vogenauer, supra note 150, at 125 (stating that the objective and
subjective distinction in the context of interpretation speaks to the will or intention
of the parties).
174. CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 1156 (Fr.); Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil
Code], Aug. 18, 1896, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL.] at 42, as amended, § 133
(Ger).
175. See generally DIMATTEO, supra note 95, at 45-50.
176. Vogenauer, supra note 150, at 126.
177. See id at 139 (discussing the reasonable person as one of two balancing
factors which make up the "theory of indication" under German law).
178. See infra notes 189-91 and accompanying text; see also CISG, supra note
1, art. 29(1) ("A contract may be modified or terminated by the mere agreement of
the parties.").
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contract. 17 9 In the common law, this approach is embedded in the
duty to read, the four-corners rule, the parol evidence rule, and the
plain meaning rule of interpretation.1 0 If intent is associated with the
meaning of the parties' written agreement, then the EAL would
assert that such rules protect the autonomy or will of private parties.
However, true intent is most likely to be made available only through
a contextual analysis of meaning. The uncovering of "true" intent
better protects the principal of private autonomy that underlies
contract law."' The CISG interpretive methodology is best
understood as embracing the objective theory of contract
interpretation through a full contextual inquiry. This is made clear
given the following interpretative framework provided in CISG
Articles 8 and 9:
* Statements and conduct "are to be interpreted according to
the understanding [of] a reasonable person."18
* In applying the reasonable person standard, "due
consideration is to be given to all relevant
circumstances ... including the negotiations, any practices
which the parties have established between themselves,
usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties."18 3
* "The parties are considered ... to have impliedly made
applicable to their contract. . . a usage" widely known in
international trade. 184
The major exception to this objectivist framework is the inter-
subjectivist methodology found in Article 8(1), mandating that a
party is bound to another party's subjective intent "where the other
party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent was."'
179. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 8-9 (indicating that the usages, practices,
statements, and conduct of the parties are considered in contract interpretation).
180. Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in
Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 761, 767 (2002) (stating that the statute of
frauds, coupled with these three aformentioned theories, meant that in classical
contract law the written document drafted by the parties usually ruled).
181. See DiMatteo, supra note 116, at 902-03 (explaining that autonomy is
central to contract law and suggesting the use of implicit and explicit consent-
based factors to determine the enforceability of penalty clauses).
182. CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(2).
183. Id. art. 8(3).
184. Id. art. 9(2).
185. Id. art. 8(1). See generally DIMATTEO, supra note 95, at 49-50.
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Under this perspective, the objective meaning of a promise is
trumped by the known idiosyncratic, subjective meaning of the
promise-receiving party. An illustration can be taken from the
common law's unilateral mistake doctrine. Generally, a reasonable
person interpretation of a contract term will prevail over the mistaken
unilateral interpretation of one of the parties. 18 6 However, the
unilateral mistake doctrine provides relief if the subjective error was
known or could not have been unknown to the non-mistaken party at
the time of contract formation.18 7
2. Intentional Contractual Incompleteness
There are three rationales for intentional contractual
incompleteness: (1) avoiding the transaction costs of negotiating a
more complete contract, (2) strategic informational asymmetry, and
(3) consensual strategic incompleteness. Judge Posner refers to these
types of incompleteness as "deliberate ambiguity."' One of the
rationales for intentional incompleteness is that such ambiguity is "a
necessary condition of making the contract."18 9 From an efficiency
perspective, such an ambiguity is rational when the cost of clarifying
or adding a term is greater than the benefit of having a more
complete contract. The costs are likely to outweigh the benefits of
completeness where there is a low probability of the event that the
term deals with will occur.' 90 The more efficient strategy would be to
keep the term open for future negotiation.191 Since the overwhelming
majority of transactions do not result in costly dispute resolution
proceedings, it is often efficient to avoid negotiation of a given
186. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(c) (1981) (stating that a
party bears the risk of a mistake when "the risk is allocated to him by the court on
the ground that it is reasonable in the circumstances to do so").
187. See, e.g., Smith v. Hughes, [1871] 6 L.R.Q.B. 597, 610-11 (U.K.) (stating
that a buyer is relieved of his obligation to buy a product if the seller believed that
the buyer was mistaken as to the nature of the actual product and if the buyer
actually was so mistaken).
188. Posner, supra note 164, at 1583.
189. Id.
190. See id. (stating parties may make a decision to delegate to the courts
completion of the contract as to a contingency, should it materialize, for
negotiation cost reasons).
191. See Avery W. Katz, Contractual Incompleteness: A Transactional
Perspective, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 169, 173-74 (2005) (noting that this is
possible because the law allows for the modification of contracts).
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term. 19 2 The costs of such negotiation outweigh the costs of resolving
a dispute over the term in litigation or arbitration due to the low
probability of such an occurrence. 193 So often the gaps and vagueness
found in contracts are the conscious choices of the contracting
parties.
Strategic informational asymmetry occurs when a party decides to
strategically withhold information in order to avoid less beneficial
terms that would result by the disclosure of the information. One
suggested response is for the courts to fill in the gap with a "penalty
default" term that punishes the non-disclosing party.194 The literature
on disclosure in contract law balances the need to protect individual
autonomy by not requiring disclosure against the fairness of
requiring the disclosure of at least material information. Although the
CISG failed to adopt mandatory disclosure rules, its inter-subjective
interpretive methodology does place pressure on the information
holder to disclose in order to subsequently prove contractual
assent.195
The case of consensual strategic incompleteness exists where both
parties suffer from a lack of full information. This lack of full
information often revolves around the transactional uncertainty of
predicting future events in a long-term contract.196 The parties may
192. See id. at 175 (identifying in particular the high cost of attorney fees that
would result from extensive negotiation).
193. See id. (making the point that for financial purposes, parties may be willing
to risk contractual failure, even if such failure results in litigation).
194. See id. (noting, however, that such a penalty would work only if the value
of the information is rather modest compared to the penalty); see also Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (stating that penalty defaults "are
designed to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to contract around
the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision that
they prefer"). The Ayres-Gertner Model distinguishes between default terms that
can be altered by agreement of the parties and immutable contract terms that
cannot be altered. Id. at 87. Most default terms, known as "majoritarian" defaults,
seek to mimic the terms that the parties would have agreed to if they had address
them. Id. at 93. By contrast, a "penalty default" provides a term that the parties do
not want; hence, they are incentivized to affirmatively address the issue so as to
avoid the unwanted term. Id. at 91.
195. This paper will discuss this notion under the topic of "particularized
consent." See infra Part III.
196. Cf Katz, supra note 191, at 175 (discussing contract incompleteness as
potentially caused by the relatively low probability of an event coming to fruition).
2011] 409
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
agree to an open term with the aim of renegotiating the issue in the
event of a post-formation development. 197 Another reason for such
consensual ambiguity is the avoidance of the risk that negotiation
over a particular term will lead to a deal-preventing impasse. The
agreement to an open term or gap in the contract is likely to be
strategic in nature because each party will work to frame the future
renegotiation in its favor. Unintentional openness, which will be
discussed in the next section's coverage of contractual ambiguity,
provides a comparison to consensual ambiguity.
A similar case of strategic incompleteness in both long-term and
short-term contracts is related to self-enforcing market mechanisms,
such as reputation. 198 In consumer contracts, the consumer expects
that a major corporation in a competitive market will agree to a fair
settlement of any problem created by a low-probability event. This
type of trust boosts the corporation's reputation (which is very
valuable in a competitive market in which there is little price
competition). 19 9 Greater sales and the reduction in transaction costs
supersede the costs from moral hazard incentives because of
consensual strategic incompleteness. The same holds for long-term
contracts. The parties decide not to regulate their relationship ex ante
since they know that for any low-probability event it will be more
efficient to modify the contract ex post, avoiding the drafting costs
and the possible relation-stressing effects of prolonged bargaining.20 0
197. Id. at 169. Economists and legal scholars use the term "incomplete
contracting" differently to refer to either obligational incompleteness or contingent
incompleteness. Legal scholars utilize the prior term, which refers to "contracts in
which the obligations are not fully specified." Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101
YALE L.J. 729, 730 (1992). Economists use the latter term, which refers to a failure
to "fully realize the potential gains from trade." Id. With this understanding,
obligational incompleteness can be used strategically to more fully capture
potential gains as events unfold.
198. See generally IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY
INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 71 (1980).
199. Ostas, supra note 103, at 546-48.
200. Cf Katz, supra note 191, at 175 (indicating that sometimes parties decide
to skip the negotiation of some terms pre-contract due after performing a cost
benefit analysis). Additionally, the economic significance of "trust" and
"confidence" plays a prominent role in the socio-economic approach to
contracting. See, e.g., AMITAI ETZONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW
ECONOMICS 10 (1988) (explaining that trust arises out of "previous transactions
based on rational calculations and efficient 'rules of thumb').
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The problem of filling in gaps in written contracts has been the
subject of much EAL literature. This literature is not concerned with
contract interpretation per se, but instead focuses on the issue of
incomplete contracts, generally discussing the issue of the fabrication
and selection of default rules.201 Defaults can be either immutable or
subject to modification by the parties.202 Given our first tenet-
deference to individual autonomy, economic reasoning suggests that
defaults should be structured so that the parties can easily tailor them
to their own needs.203 In addition, there is a general consensus that
defaults will reduce transaction costs if they mimic what the parties
themselves would have chosen if they had addressed the term in their
contract.2 04 Judge Posner notes that the parliaments of Germany and
other nations of Continental Europe have enacted detailed codes of
"contractual obligations, constituting implied terms that the parties
can, however, negate." 20 5 A similar pattern is found in the CISG,
which provides a host of gap fillers, most of which can be modified
by express agreement of the parties.
201. See generally Ayres & Gertner, supra note 197 (theorizing as to how courts
and legislatures should handle default rules efficiently from an economic
perspective).
202. Id. at 87-91.
203. Cf Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 594 (arguing that if default rules
are constructed inefficiently then contracting parties will write contracts to avoid
them, which increases transaction costs). Generally, legislatures do not possess
adequate knowledge of the costs and benefits to contracting parties necessary for
drafting efficient problem-solving default rules. Ian Ayers, Default Rules for
Incomplete Contracts, in 1 NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE
LAW 585, 279-80 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
204. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in 2 NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 277, 586 (Peter Newman ed., 1998)
(commenting that the parties would have organically included such defaults if they
could "costlessly contract"). Such rules are often referred to as "majoritarian"
defaults. Id.; see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate
Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1416, 1433 (1989) (arguing that default terms should
be what the parties would chose given "full information and costless contracting").
See generally Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation
in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV.
713, 733-36 (1997) (suggesting that in situations where network externalities
prevent parties from choosing optimal individual terms, default terms should be
centrally chosen for their substantive efficiency). For an alternate approach to
contract interpretation, see generally Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form
and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 496 (2004)
(advocating a transactional approach to the problem of contract interpretation).
205. Posner, supra note 164, at 1586.
2011] 411
AM. U.INTLL.REV.
3. Contractual Ambiguity
The most common forms of ambiguity, unlike those discussed
in the previous section, are those that are unintended. Professor
Linzer's critique of a formalist interpretation of written contracts
notes that the "flaw in plain meaning is, of course, the notion of a
latent ambiguity." 20 6 In the plain meaning and four-corners analysis,
extrinsic evidence can only be introduced in cases of patent
ambiguity.20 7 Justice Traynor, in his Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.2 08 decision reviewing the parol
evidence rule, said the following regarding the determination of
ambiguity:
The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a
written instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be plain and
unambiguous on its face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to
prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably
susceptible. 209
This idea of an alternative reasonable latent meaning supports a
more contextual interpretive methodology. It asserts that one can
rarely reach the threshold of sufficient clarity of written words
without viewing the context behind the usage.2 10 Thus, seemingly
clear contract language may be susceptible to an alternative (non-
plain meaning) interpretation through the use of extrinsic evidence.
The objective approach, stripped of the formal requirements of
a writing and the parol evidence rule, allows for a fuller contextual
inquiry. It is this contextualism that the CISG embraces in order to
uncover the true intent of the contracting parties. The formalist or
textualist approach holds that bright-line rules such as the statute of
frauds, plain meaning rule, four-corner analysis, and parol evidence
rule provide greater certainty, and thus reduce transaction costs. 2 11
206. Linzer, supra note 155, at 803.
207. See id. at 820-23 (offering an example of a case in which a patent
ambiguity existed in the agreement between the parties, which led to the
admissibility of parol evidence).
208. 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968).
209. Id. at 644.
210. See id. (explaining that a contract cannot be limited to the four corners of
the document, as this would ignore the intent as well as "presuppose a degree of
verbal precision and stability" not actually found in our language).
211. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry:
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The contextualist approach asserts that written words are generally
indeterminate and a totality of the circumstances analysis is required
to uncover true intent. 2 12 Furthermore, the so-called bright-line rules
of formalism are not very fixed or bright given that extrinsic
evidence is allowed to supplement but not contradict a written
contract.2 13 For example, the determination of ambiguity is left to
judicial discretion.2 14 This discretion can be used to "find" an
ambiguity and allow for the admission of extrinsic evidence in cases
where exclusion would work an injustice.
The majority of EAL literature supports the formalist approach to
contract interpretation.2 15 Schwartz and Scott argue in favor of the
formal interpretation of written contracts in business to business
contracts. 2 16  This formal approach includes plain meaning
interpretation, a hard parol evidence rule, and full enforcement of
merger clauses.2 17 Such an approach is viewed as promoting
efficiency given the sophistication of businesspersons and their
ability to negotiate efficient contracts. In these cases, even where
there is a long-term relationship, the inclusion of a merger clause in a
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV.
1724, 1735-44 (2001) (arguing that within the formal operation of the cotton
industry's private legal system, bright-line rules reduce transaction costs and
makes misunderstandings less likely).
212. See Miriam R. Albert, Common Sense for Common Stock Options:
Inconsistent Interpretation of Anti-Dilution Provisions in Options and Warrants,
34 RUTGERS L.J. 321, 331 (noting that this necessarily involves extrinsic
evidence).
213. See Linzer, supra note 155, at 804-08 (asserting that even courts using a
formalist approach apply the rules differently and adopt many exceptions to allow
for the admission of extrinsic evidence).
214. See id at 807 ("[I]nstead of a parol evidence 'rule,' there is a continuum of
many different approaches, all using the same name and often using the same
words.").
215. See, e.g., Mark L. Movsesian, Formalism in American Contract Law:
Classical and Contemporary, 12 IUS GENTIUM 115, 115 (focusing on the virtues
of the formalist approach, such as "bright-line rules, objective interpretation, and
party autonomy"); see also David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U.
CHI. L. REv. 842, 842 (1999) (indicating that formalist lawyers attempt to deduce
contract rules from an "essentialist understanding of the nature of promise and
consent").
216. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 547, 618 (stating that firms want
courts to enforce the contracts that the parties themselves write and not what a
decision maker with a concern for fairness would write).
217. Id.at547.
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contract signifies the genuine consent of the parties on the
enforcement of their contract without having to worry about judicial
discretion. 2 18 The probability of such a clause being included in the
contract without the will of one of the parties is minimal, thus a
strong parol evidence rule seems efficient.
The anti-formalists argue that the efficiency gains in formalism are
overstated.2 19 In fact, there are efficiency costs related to a strong
parol evidence rule and formalistic interpretation of contracts. Avery
Katz argues that such an approach "can encourage parties to expend
extra resources in negotiation, on one hand by attempting to
manipulate the formal text of the agreement in their favor, and on the
other hand by attempting to prevent the counterparty from doing
so."220 This approach replaces efficient negotiators with inefficient
lawyer-drafters, leading to an increase in transaction costs that is not
counterbalanced by the parallel reduction in administration (court)
costs due to the fact that only a small fraction of contracts end up in
court.221
The U.C.C., despite its adoption of a statute of frauds requirement,
rejects the plain meaning approach in favor of a totality of
circumstances analysis.222 It further rejects the formality of the
promise-based will theory in favor of an agreement-in-fact
approach. 223 The agreement-in-fact approach requires the use of
contextual evidence to determine the parties' true intent.22 4
218. Id.
219. See Katz, supra note 191, at 179-80 (indicting that formalistic regimes can
introduce unnecessary risk and higher costs).
220. Id. at 180.
221. See id. (noting that sales and purchasing agents are better placed to promote
overall organizational interests than their lawyers and other drafting agents).
222. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (1977) (stating that the terms of a written agreement
may be supplemented by course of dealing, usage of trade, or course of
performance). For a more complete explanation of the "totality of the
circumstances" analysis, particularly with regard to the reasonable person
benchmark, see DiMatteo, supra note 96, at 317-25.
223. See U.C.C. §1-201(3) (1977) ("'Agreement' ... means the bargain of the
parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances,
including course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade as provided
in Section 1-303.").
224. Cf Steven A. McCloskey, North Carolina Employment Case Law:
Contract Principles Abandoned, 25 N.C. CENT. L.J. 163, 170 (2003) (quoting
Snyder v. Freeman, 266 S.E.2d 593, 602 (N.C. 1980)) (noting that an agreement in
fact is one based upon circumstances showing a mutual intent of the parties).
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The differences between the evidentiary thresholds for
admitting extrinsic evidence under the CISG and the U.C.C. are not
as great as the formal rules indicate. The main difference is that the
U.C.C. orders the probative value of the evidence. Section 1-303(e)
states that when conflictive, the written agreement prevails over
extrinsic evidence, course of performance prevails over evidence of
prior dealings and trade usage, and prior dealings prevail over trade
usage.22 5 In contrast, under the CISG, the judge or arbitrator
determines the probative value of the different types of evidence on a
case-by-case basis.2 26
The ordering/non-ordering distinction is also overblown. The civil
law systems generally hold that the written contract is most probative
even though there are no formal constraints on the use of extrinsic
evidence.2 27 Also, despite the U.C.C. ordering rule, a judge applying
this rule remains free to determine if the contract language is
ambiguous. If the judge determines that it is ambiguous, then
extrinsic evidence can be admitted, as demonstrated in Nanakuli
Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., Inc.228 The case involved a
contract for the long-term supply of asphalt products which expressly
granted the supplier the right to post the price at the time of
delivery.2 2 9 The contractor asserted that, despite the express term, it
was a widely accepted trade custom to honor the prices previously
posted under long-term supply contracts.23 0 The Court held that,
notwithstanding the term's clarity in allowing ad hoc price increases,
the jury was at liberty to construe the trade usage of "price protection
as consistent with the express term."2 3' The role of contextual
evidence was prominent in this case. Despite clear, unambiguous
contract language, the court allowed the jury to use evidence of trade
225. See U.C.C. § 1-303(e) (1977) (stating, however, that "the express terms of
an agreement and any applicable course of performance, course of dealing, or
usage of trade must be construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each
other").
226. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 11 (placing no limitation on the extrinsic
evidence that parties can introduce, and as a result, the decision maker must decide
how much weight each piece of evidence is accorded).
227. See supra Parts II.B.1-2.
228. 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981) (reaching its holding, in part, by using
extrinsic evidence that spoke to the intent of the parties in making the contract).
229. Id. at 778.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 780.
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custom to trump the operation of the express term.232
4. Party-Controlled Rules ofInterpretation
Given the inherent ambiguity of written contracts, be it
intended or unintended, is there anything the contracting parties can
do to prevent the admission of extrinsic evidence in a subsequent
dispute? The principle of private autonomy suggests that the parties
should be allowed to agree on how their contract is to be
interpreted.2 33
One way to overcome the inefficiency of determining and
applying default rules of interpretation, be it under common or civil
law, is for the parties to agree ex ante on the post hoc rules of
interpretation.2 3 4 For example, the parties may agree to avoid the
application of the contra proferentem rule.23 5 A contract could
incorporate the following clause: "The parties agree that any rule of
construction to the effect that ambiguities are to be resolved against
the drafting party shall not be applied in the construction or
interpretation of this Agreement." However, there is no guarantee
that a court will disregard traditional rules of interpretation in the
face of such a provision.236
Party-determined rules of interpretation fare better in the common
law. The incorporation of a merger clause generally meets with
favorable judicial enforcement. 237 This is likely because such clauses
232. Id.
233. See Katz, supra note 191, at 178-80 (indicating that parties could include in
the contract terms specifying the interpretive methods to be used in the event a
contractual gap arises).
234. See id. at 179 ("Contracting parties can also opt into relatively formalistic
interpretative regimes by designating the tribunal or rule of law that will hear any
dispute that arises under their agreement; and again there are various ways to
achieve such a result.")
235. See Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109
COLUM. L. REv. 396, 406 (2009) (defining contra proferentum as a principle
"under which ambiguous language in the contract is interpreted against the
drafter").
236. See Katz, supra note 191, at 179 ("Even when the substantive rule of
interpretation is the same, differences in local legal culture, procedural and
evidentiary rules, or other resource constraints may make one tribunal considerably
less inclined to take an open-ended approach to gap filling than another.").
237. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119
YALE L.J. 936, 959-60 (2010) (indicating that utilization of a hard parol evidence
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align with the traditional rules of interpretation. The merger clause
expressly warrants that the contract is a final and complete
integration of the parties' agreement.2 38 Its preclusion of the use of
parol evidence to interpret or add to the contract's meaning is the
same result as if the court, independent of any merger clause,
determined that the contract was a complete integration. Thus, a
merger clause acts to mimic the parol evidence rule in order to assure
its applicability. It is doubtful that a merger clause will prevent the
entry of extrinsic evidence under CISG rules. CISG Advisory
Council Opinion No.3 attempts to clarify the enforceability of a
merger clause within the CISG's liberal evidence regime.2 39 It states:
A Merger Clause, also referred to as an Entire Agreement Clause, when in
a contract governed by the CISG, derogates from norms of interpretation
and evidence contained in the CISG. The effect may be to prevent a party
from relying on evidence of statements or agreements not contained in the
writing. Moreover, if the parties so intend, a Merger Clause may bar
evidence of trade usages.240
The Opinion thus affirms that a merger clause may be viewed as a
permissible derogation under CISG Article 6. However, unless it is
expressly negotiated and agreed to, it is unlikely to bar extrinsic
evidence.24 1
D. CONTRACT FORMATION
The article's assessment of specific provisions in the CISG closes
with an inquiry into issues associated with contact formation. As a
general rule, civil and common law traditions evolved similar rules
regarding contract formation and performance. Examples include
rule by common law courts gives merger clauses presumptive conclusive effect).
238. See id at 932 n.16 (defining such a clause as one indicating that all of the
parties' prior understandings are encompassed in the present written agreement).
239. CISG Advisory Council, CISG-AC Opinion No. 3 on Parol Evidence Rule,
Plain Meaning Rule, Contractual Merger Clause and the CISG (Oct. 23, 2004),
available at http://www.cisgac.com/UserFiles/File/CISg%20AC%200pinion%203
%20English.pdf.
240. Id. at Opinion, 3.
241. CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 3 notes that when there is a written
merger clause, "in determining the effect of such a Merger Clause, the parties'
statements and negotiations, as well as all other relevant circumstances shall be
taken into account." Id.; see infra Part III (exploring the notion of particularized
consent).
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rules pertaining to anticipatory repudiation,2 42 transfer of risk,243
implied warranties of merchantability and for a particular purpose,2 44
the foreseeability limitation on damages,245 the mitigation
principle,2 46 and excuse.247 In each of these areas, the drafters of the
CISG followed the "common core" approach, and adopted the
approaches common to both legal traditions.2 48 However, with regard
to two formation issues-effectiveness of acceptance and firm
offer-the common law and civil law diverge. Interestingly, in each
case the CISG offers a compromise, fabricating a modified third
approach-an amalgamation of conflicting civil and common law
rules.249
1. Effectiveness ofAcceptance
Regarding the effectiveness of an acceptance, the common law
offers the mailbox rule-whereby an acceptance is deemed effective
on dispatch by the offeree, rather than on receipt by the offeror.25 0
The mailbox rule protects the offeree's expectations by forming the
contract at the moment of dispatch.25 1 From an efficiency
perspective, the rule misallocates the risk that the acceptance will not
reach the offeror by placing the risk on the less efficient insurer.252
Under the rule, the risk of a lost transmission is on the offeror despite
242. CISG, supra note 1, arts. 71-72.
243. Id. arts. 66-70.
244. Id. art. 35.
245. Id. art. 74.
246. Id. art. 77.
247. Id. art. 79.
248. Id. arts. 35, 66-72, 74, 77, 79.
249. Id arts. 16(1), 16(2)(b), 18(2); infra Parts II.D.1-2.
250. The mailbox rule traces to the King's Bench. See Adams v. Lindsell,
[1818] 106 Eng. Rep. 250, 252 (K.B.) (holding that buyer was allowed to recover
damages for breach of contract from the seller, where buyer sent his acceptance of
seller's offer via mail but the arrival of letter was delayed, by no fault of the buyer,
and where seller sold the property in question to a third party before hearing back
from buyer in a timely fashion).
251. See Courtenay Canedy, Comment, The Prison Mailbox Rule and Passively
Represented Prisoners, 16 GEO. MASON L. REv. 773, 775-76 (2009) (reviewing
the traditional rationales offered in defense of the mailbox rule, such as its function
"as a shield to the offeree's reliance interests").
252. See generally Beth A. Eisler, Default Rules for Contract Formation By
Promise and the Need for the Revision of the Mailbox Rule, 79 KY. L.J. 557, 565,
583 (1991) (arguing on both economic and other grounds that the mailbox rule
needs to be reformed).
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the fact that the offeree is the party most able to effectuate
delivery.2 53
Article 18(2) of the CISG rejects the common law's mailbox rule
in favor of the civil law's receipt doctrine.2 54 The allocation of
transmission risk to the more efficient insurer supports the receipt
rule. Article 16(1) of the CISG addresses the common law's
expectancy protection rationale by freezing the offeror's right to
revoke once the acceptance is dispatched.255 However, if the
acceptance does not reach the offeror within a reasonable time, then
the receipt rule reinstates-or "unfreezes"-the offeror's right to
revoke the offer.256 Taken together, Articles 18 and 16 provide a
creative set of rules allowing for the adoption of the civil law's
receipt rule while protecting the expectancy interest to which the
common law's dispatch rule is directed.
2. Firm Offer Rule
In the area of firm offer, both civil and common law jurisdictions
recognize the importance of prohibiting merchant sellers from
revoking offers that the offeree reasonably expects to remain open.
However, under the U.C.C., the reasonableness determination is
made by the Code's enunciation of formal requirements-the offeror
must assure that the offer will remain open for a fixed time not
exceeding ninety days, it must be in writing, and signed by the
offeror.25 7 The CISG, by contrast, expands the breadth of the firm
offer principle, rendering irrevocable any offer on which the offeree
reasonably relied.258
The advantage of the U.C.C. approach is that it provides a bright-
253. See id. at 566 (discussing the operation of the rule and the unbargained-for
protection given to the offeree).
254. CISG, supra note 1, art. 18(2); see Gyula Ebrsi, Problems of Unifying Law
on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 27 AM. J.
COMP. L. 311, 317-19 (1979) (discussing the doctrine and defining it as one in
which withdrawal, revocation, and acceptance of an offer become effective only
when received by the other party).
255. CISG, supra note 1, art. 16(1).
256. Id. art. 18(2). Reasonable time is determined by the "circumstances of the
transaction" and the "rapidity of the means of communication employed by the
offeror." Id.
257. U.C.C. § 2-205 (1977).
258. CISG, supra note 1, art. 16(2)(b).
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line rule that is efficient to administer. The formalities of a writing, a
signature, and a fixed time provide strong proof of a firm offer. The
problem with the CISG's approach is that there is no foolproof
means by which an offeror can prevent a post hoc determination that
he made a firm offer. Although Article 6 of the CISG allows for the
derogation from CISG rules by agreement of the parties,259 there is
no certainty that a court will recognize an affirmation in the offer that
it is not open or that it will remain open only for a shorter than
customary time. When there is such an affirmation, the question
becomes whether the offeree can reasonable rely on the offer beyond
the time period stipulated in the offer. There is a plausible argument
that a recognized trade usage-perhaps one where an offer typically
remains open for a certain period-may trump a provision in the
offer stating otherwise, especially if the provision is in a standard
form.
The CISG's firm offer rule's failure to adopt a formality
requirement is consistent with the fact that the CISG does not require
a writing for contract formation. The interpretation rules used to
determine whether an offer is firm are the same as the rules for
interpreting a consummated contract.26 0 The CISG's recognition of
international trade usage in contract interpretation is the context in
which the offeree's reasonable reliance is likely to be determined.26 1
Practices developed by merchants in a given trade generally provide
an efficient means of applying the firm offer rule.26 2 Hence, the
drafters of the CISG once again seem to have fabricated a hybrid
rule, adopting the common law firm offer principle, but allowing it to
evolve over time through trade usage and business custom.
259. Id. art. 6.
260. See Ferrari, supra note 47, at 76-77 (discussing differing opinions as to
good faith and its interaction with the CISG in interpretation and offers).
261. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 9 (stating that unless a usage was observed by
the parties, it is not valid unless it is one of the usage regularly recognized in
international trade).
262. Cf Henry Mather, Firm Offers Under the UCC and the CISG, 105 DICK. L.
REV. 31, 31 (2000) (making the point that firm offers will become more prevalent
in the future as merchants look to branch out and make deals in unfamiliar
markets).
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III. PARTICULARIZED CONSENT: MOVING
BEYOND LAW TO BEST PRACTICES
In order to avoid the regulatory function of contract law and frame
the interpretation process, the use of particularized consent is the
most efficient means of accomplishing these goals. Particularized
consent is the use of some means, such as negotiation, legal
representation, disclosure, or initialing, to heighten the awareness of
the other contracting party to particular contract terms.2 63 The use of
particularized consent in the international sales setting is the best
practice for ensuring the enforcement of important contract terms
because it merges the subjective and objective approaches to contract
law. Obtaining particularized consent provides a heightened
objective base to prevent the use of extrinsic evidence to contradict
the enforcement of a contract provision.264 It also establishes an
evidentiary base against the party seeking the non-enforcement of a
contract provision by showing that she did know or should have
known the meaning and intent of the provision.26 5
The use of particularized consent is especially important to
buttress the enforcement of non-material or fine print terms that one
of the contracting parties deems important. In the battle of the forms
scenario, a heightened consent method increases the chances that the
designated terms will be enforced.2 66 The method of particularized
consent consists of the building of evidence of knowledge and
consent in order to overcome the admission of contradictory extrinsic
evidence. 267 From an efficiency perspective, a party should consider
the use of particularized consent when the benefits of enhancing its
enforceability are greater than the additional transaction costs
incurred to particularize the consent.
Most legal systems provide a number of immutable rules, mostly
in the consumer contract scenario, that aim to ensure the form-
receiving party's awareness of certain contract terms. The U.C.C.
263. E.g., DIMATTEO ET AL., supra note 22, at 166-68.
264. E.g., Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law
and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REv. 583, 612-14 (1990).
265. See id (inferring that actual knowledge of a term warrants its enforcement).
266. See id at 614 (suggesting further that in order to ensure enforceability of a
subordinate clause, a seller should not only obtain buyer consent to the central
terms of the clause, but also disclose the exact meaning and effect of the clause).
267. Id.
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provides a limited example of the importance of demonstrating
actual consent in the enforcement of a sales contract-in areas such
as the exclusion of warranties-by recognizing the importance of
conspicuousness. 268 The purpose of the conspicuousness requirement
is to enhance the likelihood of true consent by alerting the form
receiving party of the importance of the particular term.26 9 The
requirement of conspicuousness in areas such as disclaimer of
liability and warranty avoidance, set forth in the U.C.C. and the
Magnusson-Moss Act,2 70 is as close as American contract law,
generally, gets to the notion of particularized consent. This is a weak
form of particularized consent because it rests on the premise that
merely displaying terms in a conspicuous manner will lead the
receiving party to a better understanding of the terms' content. The
rationale is that such conspicuousness provides a cautionary
incentive to read and understand the terms. 271
The United States' Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act ("UCITA") provides a more robust particularized consent
regime, albeit in a limited context, by requiring that contracts
involving the use of self-help remedies "separately manifest assent to
... the use of electronic self-help."272 In a more general context, the
European Union's Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive
dictates "that a contractual term which has not been individually
negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement
of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights
268. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-316 (1977). Conspicuity is merely a procedural device or
formality. The U.C.C. states that "[c]onspicuous terms include the following: ...
(A) a heading in capitals equal to or greater in size than the surrounding text, or in
contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the same or lesser size;
and (B) language in the body of a record or display in larger type than the
surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the
same size, or set off from surrounding text of the same size by symbols or other
marks that call attention to the language." Id. § 1-201(b).
269. See Robert M. Lloyd, The "Circle of Assent" Doctrine: An Important
Innovation in Contract Law, 7 TENN. J. Bus. L. 237, 244 (2006) (reiterating that a
writing is sufficiently conspicuous under the U.C.C. if the writing is of a larger
size or in a contrasting color).
270. See supra note 268; Magnusson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (1975).
271. See U.C.C. § 1-201(b) ('Conspicuous' with reference to a term, means so
written, displayed, or presented that a reasonable person against which it is to
operate ought to have noticed it.").
272. U.C.I.T.A. § 816 (2002).
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and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the
consumer."2 7 3 In the event that there has been no individualized
agreement, Article 4 (1) provides that:
[T]he unfairness of a contractual term shall be assessed, taking into
account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was
concluded and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract, to all
the circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract and to all the
other terms of the contract or of another contract on which it is
dependent. 274
The Hungarian Civil Code, in introducing its national law rules on
unfair terms, provides that when assessing the unfairness of a
contractual term, "all of the circumstances leading to the conclusion
of the contract as well as the nature of the stipulated service and the
relationship of the condition in question with other contract
conditions and other contracts." 27 5 British courts also insist on a
totality of the circumstances analysis when applying the U.K.'s
unfair contracts legislation.276 One commentator observes that "the
extent to which the other side [is] familiar with the particular term"
is crucial to determining whether the term is enforceable under U.K.
law. 277
A final example of the use of particularized consent is found in the
Principles of European Contract Law which states that "terms which
have been individually negotiated take preference over those which
have not." 2 78 More telling is Article 2:104 ("Terms Not Individually
273. Council Directive 93/13, art. 3, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29 (EC) (emphasis added).
274. Id. art. 4.
275. 1959. tvi IV. tarv6ny a Polgiri T6rv6nyk6nyv (Act IV of 1959 on the Civil
Code) § 209/B(3) (Hung.).
276. English Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, c. 50, § 11(1) (U.K.); see
Salvage Ass'n v. CAP Fin. Serv. Ltd. (1995) F.S.R. 654 (Q.B.) 678 (U.K.)
(analyzing the fairness and reasonableness of two contract provisions in light of
Section 11(1) of the 1977 Act).
277. Richard Lawson, Matter of Construction, 156 NEw L.J. 1310, 1311 (2006)
(emphasis added). Reiter and Swan use the reasonable expectations approach to
determine contractual intent and which terms and standards the parties are
expected to enforce. They suggest that "[t]he court should [] strive to protect the
reasonable expectations of the parties, discovered through experience in living or
through expert evidence where it is helpful." Barry J. Reiter & John Swan,
Contracts and the Protection of Reasonable Expectations, in STUDIES IN CONTACT
LAW 1, 8 (Barry J. Reiter & John Swan eds., 1980).
278. Principles of European Contract Law [PECL] art. 5:104 (1999).
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Negotiated") which states that non-negotiated terms cannot be
enforced against a party unless "the party invoking them took
reasonable steps to bring them to the other party's attention before or
when the contract was concluded." 27 9 It further raises the threshold of
notice by stating that "terms are not brought appropriately to a
party's attention by a mere reference to them in the contract
document, even if that party signs the document." 28 0 Accordingly,
these guidelines should be used by the international merchant to
ensure the enforcement of contract terms. Obtaining particularized
consent is especially warranted when the seller transacts business
through intermediaries, such as a foreign sales representative, to
ensure that there is strong evidence that the ultimate purchasers have
given knowing consent to the terms important to the seller.
Under general economic theory, the providing of additional
information, transaction costs aside, should lead to more efficient
contract terms. Knowledge of the existence and meaning of a
contract term increases the chances that it is the product of
consent.28 1 This has been shown to be the case even in the application
of such doctrines as unconscionability. An empirical study showed
that consent-based factors, and not substantive fairness, were better
predictors of unconscionability decisions.2 8 2 If consent-based factors
are present, such as conspicuousness, negotiation, knowledge, or
being represented by an attorney, a court will rarely find a case of
unconscionability even in cases of substantive one-sidedness.
Alternatively stated, the existence of consent-enhancing factors
greatly increases the likelihood of the enforceability of contract
terms.
"When a party seeks to incorporate standard terms into an offer or
acceptance, courts consider whether such terms have been fairly
279. Id. art. 2:104(1).
280. Id. art. 2:104(2).
281. See Meyerson, supra note 264, at 613 (quoting Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ("[When a party] signs
a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is
hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent,
was ever given to all the terms.").
282. Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of
Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
1067 (2006).
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communicated to the other party."283 While "the CISG does not
specifically address the incorporation of standard terms, national
courts generally agree that the CISG's provisions on contract
formation and interpretation determine whether standard terms have
been validly incorporated into the contract."2 84 Alternatively, a view
can be taken that CISG Article 4 places the issue of validity of
standard terms clearly outside the CISG's scope and puts it within
the domestic law domain.2 85
The argument here is not that the CISG requires or even
encourages particularized consent of certain contract terms, but that
it is a best practice for parties to obtain particularized consent to
terms they deem important. The additional transaction costs of
obtaining such consent are likely to be outweighed by the benefits of
increasing the probability of enforcement. Offhand, the terms for
which particularized consent would most commonly produce
efficiency gains include: arbitration, price adjustment, warranties,
notice of non-conformity requirements, unusual force majeure
events, extended inspection rights, damages, and remedy limitation
clauses.
Assuming the efficiency of obtaining particularized consent on
certain contract terms, the issue becomes how much information
needs to be communicated to the form or contract receiving party?
Civil law legal systems emphasize that a party must be reasonably
aware of the terms the other seeks to incorporate, but how does one
measure reasonable awareness?
In general, although not expressly stated in the CISG, the burden
of proof falls on the party who benefits from proving a proposition.
In the case of standard terms, the party that argues that its standard
terms are part of the contract is required to prove that the parties
agreed to their incorporation. 286 Standard terms-generally referred
to in Europe as "general conditions"-are often not discussed in the
negotiation of a sales contract, making proof of express agreement to
283. DIMATTEO ET AL., supra note 22, at 64.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. See, e.g., Council Directive 93/13, supra note 273, art. 3 (indicating that the
seller or supplier has the burden of proving that the term was individually
negotiated).
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their incorporation difficult to prove .287
There are a number of factual scenarios in which the incorporation
of standard terms is at issue. The first scenario arises at the formation
of the contract, when a party attempts to insert its standard terms into
the contract-sometimes by simply referencing their existence.288
The second arises when a party attempts to insert its standard terms
subsequent to the formation of the contract-often done by placing
the standard terms in a subsequent document, such as an invoice,
packing slip, or purchase order.289 Lastly, the third arises when both
parties attempt to insert their own standard terms into the contract at
the time of formation, resulting in conflicting terms.290
This analysis of the use of particularized consent is primarily
directed at the first scenario. Particularized consent's main purpose is
ensuring the enforcement of a term in the contract. The courts
generally respond to the second scenario by holding that standard
terms cannot be unilaterally incorporated into a contract subsequent
to its formation. 29 1 The third scenario is the phenomenon known as
"the battle of the forms." Due to the complexity of the battle of forms
and its treatment under Article 19 of the CISG, the third scenario is
287. See Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Sept. 13, 2001, docket
No. 6 Ob 73/01f (Austria), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
010913a3.html (recognizing the requirement that the receiving party be aware of
the standard terms, but noting that awareness can be implied and, therefore,
acceptance of the terms can be implicit).
288. See id (indicating that implied inclusion of a standard term can be effected
only under strict prerequisites).
289. See id. (describing the possibility for a standard term to be impliedly added
to the contract when the term was "hinted to" in the context of a long-term
business relationship and there had no objection to the term).
290. See Kaia Wildner, Art. 19 CISG: The German Approach to the Battle of the
Forms in International Contract Law: The Decision of the Federal Supreme Court
of Germany of 9 January 2002, 20 PACE INT'L L. REv. 1, 3 (2008) (identifying this
method as a "battle of forms" in which parties exchange forms containing standard
terms that conflict).
291. E.g., Chateau des Charmes Wines Ltd. v. Sabat6 USA Inc., 328 F.3d 528,
531 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a forum selection clause was not part of the
contract as it was not included in the initial oral agreements, but was instead added
in later invoices); Chateau des Charmes Wines Ltd v. Sabat6 USA Inc., [2005] O.J.
No. 4604, 29-31 (Can. Ont. Master) (reaching the same conclusion-that the
forum selection clause on the invoices did not constitute part of the contracts
between the parties).
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not part of the current discussion.29 2 This is mainly due to the fact
that a single party has little control, if any, over the standard terms
that a court will recognize in the battle of the forms scenario.
The question remains what is the best method to incorporate
standard terms at the time of contract formation? The common
approach recognizes that the incorporating party holds the risk of
non-incorporation, and thereby has the burden of proof. As a
practical matter, the incorporating party should lay an evidentiary
base for fulfilling its burden of proof that the terms were an agreed-to
part of the contract. Some courts require the terms be made available
to the other party prior to or at the time the contract is formed.2 93 A
court will reject such an attempt to incorporate standard terms if it
determines that the parties concluded an oral agreement, which
lacked those terms, prior to the exchange of documents or the
providing of standard terms. 2 94 This was the case in ISEA Industrie
S.p.A. v. Lu S.A., where despite the fact that the standard terms of the
buyer were included on the back of a document signed by the seller,
the court held that the incorporation was ineffective.2 95
The majority of CISG case law holds that the receiving party must
be made aware of the standard terms by the incorporating party.
Further, the incorporating party must communicate its intent that the
terms should be incorporated into the contract. In 2010, an American
court rejected a buyer's argument that it never agreed to the seller's
standard terms placed into the seller's offer, where there was some
evidence that the buyer was aware of those terms and the seller's
intent to incorporate them.296 The buyer argued "that the mere receipt
292. For a detailed analysis of how the CISG, and in particular Germany, treats
conflicting standard terms, see generally Wildner, supra note 290.
293. Larry A. DiMatteo et al., The Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law:
An Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
299, 346-47 (2004).
294. E.g., Chateau des Charmes Wines Ltd., 328 F.3d at 531.
295. Cour d'appel [CA] [Regional Court of Appeals] Paris, Dec. 13, 1995 (Fr.),
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951213fl.html (determining that the
terms and conditions present on the back of the form signed by the seller were not
accepted because there was no reference to the terms at the time the seller signed).
296. Golden Valley Grape Juice & Wine, LLC v. Centrisys Corp., No. CVF 09-
1424 LJO GSA, 2010 WL 347897, *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2010) (indicating that
because the terms were sent as an attachment to the offer, and there was evidence
that the buyer opened some of the attachments, the buyer cannot say that they were
unaware of the terms and conditions sent to them by the seller).
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of the General Conditions [was] not enough to accept the
conditions,"29 7 but the court held that the buyer accepted the standard
terms of the offer when it sold the product to a third-party.298
Therefore, the court considered the terms to be accepted by conduct.
As previously discussed, a successful incorporation of standard
terms requires a threshold of awareness or knowledge by the non-
incorporating party and a showing of intent by the incorporating
party to incorporate the terms at the time of formation. The
requirements of awareness and intent are generally interrelated. A
party's awareness of the other party's standard terms can be the basis
for a finding of intent. An Austrian court noted that incorporation
will be implied if the terms are "included in the proposal .. . in a way
that the other party under the given circumstances knew or could not
have been reasonably unaware of [the] intent" to incorporate the
terms.2 99 It further noted that intent can be established through
express or implied reference in the offer, as well as through the
contract negotiations or through an established practice.3 00
As noted above, incorporation can be based upon an established
practice of the parties through a course of dealings. The importance
of the existence of a long-term relationship played a key role in a
recent Dutch case, which dealt with the issue of whether the
acceptance of an offer that merely referenced the seller's standard
terms constituted an acceptance of those terms.3 01 The court noted
that "there was no established business relationship between the
parties," so therefore simple reference to the standard terms was
insufficient to make the terms part of the contract.3 02 Additionally the
seller should have provided to "the buyer a reasonable opportunity
before or at the time of concluding the contract . .. to become aware
of the . .. general conditions."3 03 Since this had not occurred, the
297. Id. at *4.
298. See id. (indicating that pursuant to CISG Art. 19, a buyer may assent to
buying goods through conduct relating to payment or dispatch of goods).
299. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Dec. 17, 2003, docket No. 7
Ob 275/03x (Austria), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/031217
a3.html.
300. Id.
301. Rb Utrecht 21 jaunuari 2009, HA ZA 08-1642 (GmbH/Quote Foodprints
B.V.) (Neth.), available at http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/090121nl.html.
302. Id. at Editorial Remarks.
303. Id.
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Dutch court concluded that the buyer could not reasonably acquire an
understanding that the terms would become part of the contract.3 04
In an earlier case, a German court took a hard view of intent as
requiring express agreement to the existence and content of the
standard terms.3 05 However, the court noted that intent to accept an
offer or counteroffer containing the standard terms can be implied. It
held that the urging by the original offeror (buyer) for immediate
delivery would generally constitute an acceptance of the seller's
counteroffer including the standard terms.306 But, ultimately, the
court held that because the seller's standard terms were available
only in the German language, they were not incorporated into the
contract-the language of which was English.307 Notwithstanding
this holding, the trend is that incorporation of the terms is appropriate
if done so in any major language used in international business
dealings.
Another German court noted that the final arbiter of whether
standard terms are incorporated is the reasonable person.308 In that
case, the buyer placed a number of orders with a seller who
responded by sending written order confirmations containing the
seller's standard terms. The court held that in applying the
reasonable person standard, a certain threshold of communication
regarding the standard terms was necessary before the terms could be
deemed incorporated into the contract. This evidentiary threshold
included proof that "the recipient . .. must be provided with the
general terms and conditions, or [the recipient] must be given the
opportunity to reasonably get to know [them]." 30 9 The court
determined that the evidentiary threshold was met, stating that the
304. In its decision, the court invoked German case law "on the application of
general conditions on the basis of the CISG, which emphasizes that general
conditions will only be applicable if the text of such conditions is handed over to
the offeree before or at the time of the conclusion of the contract." Id.
305. Oberlandesgericht Disseldorf [OLG] [Provincial Appellate Court] Apr. 21,
2004, 15 U 88/08 (Ger.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040421
g3.html.
306. Id. 1(b)(bb)(1).
307. Id.
308. Oberlandesgericht MiInchen [OLG] [Provincial Appellate Court] Jan. 14,
2009, 20 U 3683/08 (Ger.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090114
g1.html.
309. Id.
2011] 429
AM. U.INT'LL.REV.
receiving party must have taken notice of the standard terms included
in the footers of the confirmations as the first order was
countersigned and returned.3 10 In essence, the court held that standard
terms inserted into an offer or acceptance met the awareness and
intent requirements for incorporation.
In the above case, the German court 'did not rule on whether
standard terms could be incorporated merely by reference in the offer
or acceptance, due to the fact that the standard term at issue was
written into the confirmation."' On the other hand, it does not
expressly reject the notion that the full set of standard terms, not
expressly written into the offer or acceptance, may be incorporated
into the contract in some circumstances. In cases where there is clear
intent of a party to incorporate its standard terms or the reference was
made over a long course of dealings and the other party failed to
object, a finding of an implicit agreement may be reached.3 12 As an
aside, the fact that there was no reference in the body of the seller's
form to the standard terms-which were included exclusively in the
document's footnotes-was not considered important by the court.
Some courts refuse to enforce terms that derogate from CISG rules
without proof of particularized express consent. Article 6 states that
"parties may exclude the application of this Convention .. . or
derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions."313
However, excluding or varying the application of a CISG provision
may require more than inserting an express term in the written
contract. For example, an Italian court held that the party seeking to
enforce the derogation must prove the other party's awareness of the
relevant CISG provision and the express intent to exclude it.3 14
310. See id. (arguing that the buyer is expected to comprehensively check
communications and take notice of any terms and conditions indicated therein).
311. See id. ("Buyer is [] expected to check the written communications
comprehensively and to take notice of the general terms and conditions included
therein.").
312. E.g., Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Dec. 17, 2003, docket
No. 7 Ob 275/03x (Austria), available at http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/031217
a3.html.
313. CISG, supra note 1, art. 6.
314. See Tribunale di Padova, 25 febbfraio 2004, No. 40552 (It.), available at
http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/040225i3.html (indicating that knowledge of the
CISG's applicability must be clearly shown before the court can credit the parties'
intent to have the domestic rule operate).
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Another example of the need for particularized consent relates to
the express recognition of CISG's Article 29 that a contract can
require modifications to be made in writing."' However, an Austrian
court rejected that such a provision is sufficient to derogate from
Article I1's no writing requirement by failing to enforce a writing
requirement clause inserted into a standard form contract.3 16 The
court held that such a writing requirement is enforceable only if the
party against whom it is being asserted gave informed consent.3 17
In sum, due to the CISG's liberal use of extrinsic evidence, the
most efficient means to ensure enforcement of "important" terms is
the implementation of procedural steps designed to obtain
particularized consent. Particularized consent should be recognized
as a best practice when the costs of obtaining consent, including the
probability that the term would be construed as a deal-breaker, is
outweighed by the value of ensuring the term's enforceability,
diminished by the probability of the term's use. Such an approach is
aligned with the underlying EAL assumption that terms that are a
true expression of the parties' intent are the most efficient.
IV. ASSESSING THE VALUE OF COMPARATIVE
EAL
It has been argued elsewhere that comparative EAL is a relatively
useless method for comparing laws from different national legal
systems. The argument is that the differences in legal culture often
justify the development of different contract rules and at the same
time are efficient within each given cultural context.3 18 Professors
Alpa and Giampieri assert that:
315. CISG, supra note 1, art. 29.
316. See Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Feb. 6, 1996, docket No.
10 Ob 518/95 (Austria), available at http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/960206
a3.html (determining that the seller's general conditions in the contract were not
agreed upon, and therefore the writing requirement did not govern as the other
party was not aware of the requirement).
317. Id.
318. See Guido Alpa & Alberto Giampieri, Law and Economics and Method
Analysis: The Contractual Damages Issue, Jus (1995), http://www.jus.unitn.it/
cardozo/review/Contract/Alpa-1995/alpa.html#damages (highlighting the negative
treatment of voluntary breach by the French and Italian legal systems compared to
the tendency in English common law to disregard voluntary breach).
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The analysis of some of the rules related to the breach of contract and the
relative damages recovery techniques shows that the models of law and
economics cannot be always applied: they are always based either on a
certain law system or on legal concepts typical to a peculiar experience;
the adoption of a perfect, ideal, abstract model may be useful as a general
framework, but, in order to achieve practical results, it is necessary to
carry out an analysis in light of the applicable law, taking into account the
interpretation given by the jurisprudence and the concepts on which same
is grounded.319
The present article considered instances where the CISG chose
among rules from different legal regimes, and the adopted rule in
most cases was taken from the civil law. However, it does not
necessarily follow that the civil law is more efficient, as oftentimes
the apparent choice of one rule still ended with hybridized results.
For example, it was noted that CISG's Article 18(2) rejects the
common law's mailbox rule in favor of a receipt rule.3 20 But, Article
16(1) addresses the major concern underlying the mailbox rule
(offeree's expectation of contract formation) by freezing the offeror's
right to revoke the offer upon the dispatch of the acceptance.3 21
Another example of divergence is the CISG's rejection of the
U.C.C.'s perfect tender rule in favor of the fundamental breach rule.
The perfect tender and the fundamental breach rules are relatively
efficient within the context of their use.3 22 As noted in Part I.A. 1., in
the U.S. domestic market, the seller's costs of retrieving or trans-
shipping goods to another buyer, following a rejection, does not
amount to the incurring of undue costs. Therefore, the perfect tender
rule is better suited for domestic market transactions. In contrast,
having goods rejected in a faraway country is likely to result in
substantial expenses to the seller. In addition, the buyer in an
international transaction is the more efficient party to obtain some
value for the non-conforming goods. In the international sales
scenario, the fundamental breach approach is the more efficient rule.
Also, the divergence between the CISG's fundamental breach rule
319. Id.
320. CISG, supra note 1, art. 18(2); see supra notes 254-56 and accompanying
text.
321. CISG, supra note 1, art. 16(1) ; see supra notes 254-56 and accompanying
text.
322. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
432 [26:2
COMPARATIVE EFFICIENCY
and the U.C.C.'s perfect tender rule is not as great as it may seem.
Reviewing the U.C.C. as a whole shows that the absolute right of the
buyer to reject non-conforming tenders of goods under the perfect
tender rule is not so absolute. That right is qualified by U.C.C.
Sections 2-602 and 2-603, which require, respectively, that the buyer
inspect the goods within a reasonable time and give reasonable
notice or lose the right to reject,3 23 and "after rejection . .. follow any
reasonable instructions received from the seller with respect to the
goods . ... "324 In the absence of such instructions, it further obligates
the buyer to obtain salvage value for goods that are "perishable or
threaten to decline in value speedily." 3 25 Thus, the CISG rule, context
aside, is not as divergent from the common law rule as initially
perceived, and relative efficiency of result is closer than the rejection
rule would indicate.
A. EVOLUTIONARY EFFICIENCY
Judge Posner argued that the common law is generally made
up of efficient rules.3 26 The reason given for such efficiency is that
courts in deciding cases intuitively use an economic analysis in the
application of legal rules. Others extended this theory to argue that
the common law becomes more efficient over time.3 27 One version of
323. See U.C.C. § 2-602 (1977). Compare CISG, supra note 1, art. 38, with id
art. 39.
324. U.C.C. § 2-603(1) (1977).
325. Id.
326. See POSNER, supra note 10, at 98 (explaining that the "common law
method is to allocate responsibilities between people engaged in interacting
activities in such a way as to maximize the joint value, or, what amounts to the
same thing, minimize the joint cost of the activities").
327. See generally John C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of
Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978) (suggesting that efficiency increases
are the result of either judges preferring efficiency or a process of natural selection
whereby more efficient rules persist and less efficient ones are replaced or
overruled); Priest, supra note 8 (noting that even when both parties are not
interested in setting a precedent, the common law still evolves toward efficiency);
Rubin, supra note 60 (indicating that when both parties are interested in setting
precedent, inefficient rules will evolve out of the law); Jeffrey Evans Stake,
Evolution of Rules in a Common Law System: Differential Litigation of the Fee
Tail and Other Perpetuities, 32 FL. ST. L. REv. 401 (2005) (positing that internal
and external competition helps to develop efficient rules in the common law
process). But see generally Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven Willborn, The Efficiency
of the Common Law Reconsidered, 14 GEO. MASON L. REv. 157 (1991) (arguing
against the purported general tendency of the common law to evolve efficiently;
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this evolutionary model asserts that those cases most likely to be
disputed involve inefficient rules.3 28 Disputes involving the
application of efficient rules are more likely to be settled out of
court. Thus, courts over time are given the opportunity to work
inefficient rules out of the common law. Professor Rubin qualifies
this assertion by noting that evolutionary efficiency is not uniform
throughout the common law because it depends more on the
characteristics of the litigants than it does on the actions of judges.3 29
Evolutionary efficiency is most likely to happen when both parties
to the dispute are interested in setting a precedent where the existing
rule is inefficient.33 0 The only further modification of this version of
evolutionary theory is that the characteristics of the parties change
over time. Cases of only one or no interested parties could become
cases of two interested parties. This is likely to happen in response to
changes in the market-or government regulation thereof. From the
perspective of the long-term evolution of legal rules, all rules will
evolve towards efficiency or the government will intervene in an
necessity of "recurrence, legal standing of cost-bearers, representativeness, and
stability" probably apply only in reality to a small portion of cases within the
common law system or do not exist at all); Adam J. Hirsch, Evolutionary Theories
of Common Law Efficiency: Reasons for (Cognitive) Skepticism, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 425 (2005) (making the point that common law rule-making is limited by
bounded rationality; common law change is often inadvertent).
328. See Hirsch, supra note 327, at 428 (indicating that "relentless pressure of
periodic, lopsided litigation exerts itself upon an inefficient rule until it gives
way").
329. Rubin, supra note 60, at 53. Professor Rubin distinguishes levels of
evolutionary efficiency based on the characteristics of the disputing parties. The
pairings of parties is divided into cases where both parties are interested in setting
a precedent, where only one party is interested in setting a precedent, and where
neither party is interested in setting a precedent. See id. at 53-57 (analyzing the
outcomes in each situation). It is only in the first scenario (two-party interest) that
efficient evolutionary outcomes are most likely. If the defendant in the first
scenario is subject to an inefficient rule, then he/she will be incentivized to litigate.
In short, "efficient rules will be maintained, and inefficient rules litigated until
overturned." Id. at 53. In the second scenario (one-party interest), the party
interested in setting or retaining a precedent is over time more likely to get a
solution favorable to his side. See id. at 55 (suggesting that this is due to the
tendency for that party to bring many claims to court ). This solution (rule change)
may not be the most efficient one. In the third scenario (no-party interest), the
status quo rule will persist because neither party has an incentive to litigate for a
rule change and are most likely to settle out of court based upon the existing rule.
Id. at 56.
330. Id. at 53.
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attempt to provide more efficient rules.331
The importance of the evolutionary efficiency argument is that it is
internal to a given legal system. If we assume that both the civil and
common law systems evolve toward more efficient rules, then we are
still presented with the question of which one is more efficient in
cases where they have evolved different rules. This is where
comparative law and economics has a role to play. This comparison
would be most striking if legal systems were highly insulated. The
greater the level of insularity the more one would expect to see
divergence in rules and the relative efficiency of rules.332 This is not
the case with the civil and common law systems, as both systems
have been exposed to each over the centuries. This allowed for
greater convergence in the systems through cross-fertilization,
transplantation, and harmonization.3 33 More recently, the evolution of
the common market assisted convergence in European contract law.
The CISG provides an opportunity to examine, from an efficiency
perspective, some of the remaining vestiges of divergence in the law
of sales. Some argue that when legal systems compete, the more
efficient one will win the battle of competing rules.3 34 The findings of
this article tentatively support this argument.
331. Cf id. (indicating that governmental agencies and other corporate bodies
are repeat players, and thus are necessarily interested in cases both for their
individual outcomes and precedential value).
332. See, e.g., Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles and CISG -
Sources of Inspiration for English Courts?, 19 PACE INT'L L. REv. 9, 9-10 (2007)
(explaining how countries that are parties to international conventions often
interpret them with regard to their existing domestic laws as opposed to
interpreting the conventions in a way that recognizes their international character).
333. See generally id (explaining that the convergence in European contract law
is a by-product of the evolution of the common market).
334. See Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the
Common Law: A Hypothesis, 8 AUSTL. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 1-3 (2004) (indicating
that competition is important in the evolution of efficiency, but that it is not the
sole factor); Todd J. Zwicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law:
A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1551, 1554 (2003) (discussing the
competition between courts of concurrent jurisdiction in England and the evolution
of pro-plaintiff rules).
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B. BENEFITS OF COMPARATIVE EAL
Comparative EAL is part of a long history of comparative law
analysis.3  Legal systems borrowed rules from each other for many
years. Some transplanted entire areas of law. Comparative legal
historian Alan Watson noted that "legal transplants-the moving of a
rule or a system of law from one country to another, or from one
people to another-have been common since the earliest recorded
history."33 6 Comparative contract law has existed as long as
comparative law. Given the different sources-Roman Law for the
civil law and English judge-made law for the common law-scholars
continue to compare divergences in the contract law between the two
systems.337 Due to the divergence in the rules of these two major
legal systems, business practitioners and legal scholars have long
sought a harmonizing, supranational law that would facilitate
transborder transactions. The CISG is a recent product of that search.
It is only natural that comparative legal scholarship should analyze
such movements between legal systems. Such a descriptive endeavor
leads to prescriptive suggestions of which legal system-specific rules
better respond to modern, international transactions. EAL provides
one means of choosing between divergent national rules. Private
international law conventions, like the CISG, provide opportunities
to apply EAL principles to non-nation-specific private law. This is
especially true when alternative rules were available to drafters of
335. See generally Rudolf B. Schlesinger, The Past and Future of Comparative
Law, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 477 (1995) (presenting the historical perspective of one of
the founders of modem comparative private law, Professor Schlesinger). See also
Ferdinand F. Stone, The End to be Served by Comparative Law, 25 TUL. L. REV.
325, 330 (1951) (indicating that comparative law has long been highlighted as
important by business, science, government, and social service).
336. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 21 (2d ed. 1993).
337. See generally CONTRACT LAW TODAY: ANGLO-FRENCH COMPARISONS
(Donald Harris & Denis Tallon eds., 1989) (reporting an academic collaboration
which concluded that French and English contract law are similar because
contracts perform the same function in both systems, but that the bodies of law
diverge in their application); G.H. TREITEL, REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT:
A COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT (1988) (comparing remedies available to the victim for
breach of contract in civil and common law countries); John D. McCamus,
Disgorgement for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Perspective, 36 LoY. L.A.
L. REv. 943 (2003) (comparing American and English law in regards to
disgorgement for breach of contract).
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such conventions. The fact that the CISG is a blend of common and
civil law rules makes it an ideal avenue for comparative EAL
scholarship.
C. COMPARATIVE EAL AND THE CISG
The current comparative efficiency analysis suggests three general
areas for further inquiry-two descriptive and one normative. The
first area is whether the CISG makes international sales contracting
more or less efficient. This descriptive analysis can and should be
done at two levels. The first level-the one implored in this article-
looks at the choices presented to the CISG drafters and the resultant
adopted rules to assess the efficiency of the selected rules. The
second level analysis recognizes the likely divergence between the
rules as written and the rules as applied. This divergence is most
likely in the CISG context due to the fact that its rules are applied by
courts from different legal traditions. This divergence requires an
analysis into whether jurisprudential developments in the application
of CISG rules make the rules more or less efficient. At the same
time, an ongoing normative analysis would involve taking the
findings of the comparative efficiency analysis and asking what
changes should be considered to make international sales law more
efficient?
The intellectual benefit of comparative efficiency analysis in the
context of the CISG is that it forces the evaluator to critically assess
nation-specific rules. A major benefit of the use of EAL in
comparative law is that it improves the means by which scholars
from different legal traditions are able to communicate. The
nomenclature of efficiency-transaction costs, most efficient insurer,
default rules, and wealth maximization-can be applied across legal
systems. It provides a means to more rigorously describe the
consequences of competing rules. Economic rationales may also be
used to justify a compromise between competing rules. The CISG's
acceptance of the receipt rule3 38 can be seen as the proper allocation
of risk to the best insurer. The freezing of the revocation of offer
power upon the dispatch of the acceptance3 3 9 can be seen as an
efficient attempt at protecting the expectancy of the offeree. In the
338. CISG, supra note 1, art. 18(2).
339. CISG, supra note 1, art. 16(1).
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end, the underlying policies behind the adoption of divergent rules
among different legal systems cannot be uncovered through EAL.
Yet, EAL allows for a better description of the degree that
divergence exists.
A final example of the descriptive power of EAL can be seen in
the area of pre-contractual liability. On the surface there seems to be
two diametrically opposed rules-the civil law's acceptance of the
duty of good faith negotiations and the common law's rejection of
any good faith obligation prior to contract formation. But in fact, as
discussed earlier,34 0 the common law evolved means to overcome the
inefficiency of a party incurring sunk costs while promoting the
efficiency of allowing parties the freedom to investigate potentially
beneficial collaborations without incurring liability. This balance of
protecting reasonable reliance and not inhibiting exploratory
negotiations can be seen in the evolution of the common law's
principle of promissory estoppel and the recognition that parties can
enter into a binding agreement to negotiate in good faith.34 '
CONCLUSION
Law and economics allows for the study of the comparative
efficiency of rules found in different legal systems. It also allows for
the normative claim that only the better or more efficient rules
should be adopted at the level of uniform international sales or
contract law. The ability to select or fabricate efficient rules offers an
alternative to a common-core approach to unification and
harmonization of national laws. The economic analysis of law
provides a means of selecting the more efficient laws from among
conflicting national rules.3 42
Additionally, the CISG provides a medium for such a
comparative analysis, as it is a hybrid or amalgamation of civil and
common law rules.3 43 The drafters were faced with competing or
conflicting rules offered by the two legal systems, and their ultimate
340. See supra note 107.
341. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach is for Suckers, 63
VAND. L. REv. 1003, 1039 (2010) (indicating that courts, when analyzing a claim
for promissory estoppel, tend to look more at the promisee's reasonable reliance
than the actual promise).
342. See supra Part I.B.
343. See supra Part I.A.1.
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selection of one or the other provides an opportunity to test the
theoretical efficiency of each. This article begins with such an
analysis and, in the end, concludes that the drafters were mostly
successful in selecting the more efficient rules. However, the lack of
comprehensiveness and the abdication of coverage of numerous
areas of sales law renders the overall efficiency of the CISG less than
optimal.
* * *
